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ABSTRACT 
Humans, as social beings, are susceptible to social influence in their judgements, beliefs and 
behaviours. Over the last 70 years, a great wealth of data from experimental social psychology 
has demonstrated that social knowledge affects the way humans perceive and interpret their 
environment, giving rise to cognitive, perceptual, attentional and motivational biases. Already in 
the 1950’s, Solomon Ash (1951), in a series of perceptual judgement experiments, demonstrated 
that humans could alter their responses when these differed from a majority. Moreover, the 
degree of uncertainty triggered by stimuli in the environment has been shown to increase human’s 
vulnerability to social opinion. More recently, neuroscience began to explore automatic 
unconscious and controlled conscious brain responses to social stimuli, mainly face expressions. 
To date, however, the temporal unfolding of attentional and perceptual processes under 
uncertainty and social conflict remains unclear, particularly regarding the perception of 
ambiguous stimuli other than faces in a social context. Thus, the aim of the three studies in this 
thesis, was to investigate whether early perception and higher order cognitive processes were 
altered when healthy and socially anxious subjects were presented with ambiguous stimuli and 
when their responses were either endorsed or disputed. For this, a novel experimental paradigm 
was created allowing us to measure event-related potentials (ERPs) in response to visual stimuli, 
before and after social feedback indicated by a face displaying a happy (agreement) or disgusted 
expression (disagreement). Participants were asked to judge the colour of a square (the probe) 
that was either clearly blue or green (distinct probes) or were highly ambiguous bluish-green 
colour (ambiguous probes). They were also asked to indicate their level of confidence in those 
judgments, after which they received social feedback either endorsing or disputing the 
participants’ responses. Participants were then presented the stimulus again and asked to 
reconsider their decision and subjective confidence level. Behavioural results showed that 
confidence levels decreased whereas the number of revisions increased, both with task difficulty 
  
and with conflicting social feedback across healthy subjects. Moreover, this pattern was enhanced 
across socially anxious individuals. Event-related-potential data revealed differences beginning 
at already 100 ms after ambiguous stimuli presentations compared to distinct stimuli, as well as 
enhanced early amplitudes following disputed feedback. These findings are compatible with 
heightened sensory facilitation of visual information, demonstrating that uncertainty and social 
pressure modify early perceptual brain processes. The same pattern was reduced across socially 
anxious individuals suggesting a reduction in early attentional processes to external ambiguous 
stimuli due to excessive self-focusing and anticipation of the social situation. Additionally, later 
ERP components, starting at around 300 ms, were decreased for distinct stimuli compared to 
ambiguous probes in line with higher subjects’ signal detection accuracy and metacognitive 
experiences.  
Overall, findings indicate that unconscious perception to stimuli in social environments are 
modified when subjects are faced with uncertainty and social pressure and that these perceptual 
processes are diminished in the socially anxious population, whereas, self-awareness 
metacognitive processes begin at a later stage when subjects are certain about the physical 
attributes of the stimuli.  
 
Key words: Event-related potentials, early visual perception, attentional mechanisms, 
uncertainty, social feedback, metacognition, social anxiety disorder 
 
 
  
  
Résumé en français 
Les êtres humains, en tant qu'êtres sociaux, sont susceptibles d'influence sociale dans leurs 
jugements, leurs croyances et leurs comportements. Au cours des 70 dernières années, une grande 
quantité de données issues de la psychologie sociale expérimentale a démontré que les 
connaissances sociales affectent la façon dont les humains perçoivent et interprètent leur 
environnement, ce qui entraîne des biais cognitifs, perceptuels, attentionnels et motivationnels. 
Déjà dans les années 50, Solomon Ash (1951), dans une série d’expériences de jugement 
perceptuel, démontrait que les humains pouvaient modifier leurs réponses lorsque celles-ci 
différaient de la majorité. De plus, il a été démontré que le degré d’incertitude provoqué par des 
stimuli environnementaux augmentait la vulnérabilité de l’homme à l’opinion sociale. Plus 
récemment, les neurosciences ont commencé à explorer les réponses cérébrales inconscientes et 
contrôlées aux stimuli sociaux, principalement les expressions de visages. À ce jour, toutefois, le 
déroulement temporel des processus d’attention et de perception dans des situations d’incertitude 
et de conflits sociaux reste flou, en particulier en ce qui concerne la perception de stimuli 
ambigus, autres que les visages, dans un contexte social. L'objectif des trois études de cette thèse 
était donc de déterminer si la perception précoce et les processus cognitifs d'ordre supérieur 
étaient altérés lorsque des sujets tout-venants ainsi que des sujets présentant une anxiété sociale, 
étaient face à des stimuli ambigus et que leurs réponses étaient soit approuvées, soit contestées. 
Pour cela, un nouveau paradigme expérimental a été créé, nous permettant de mesurer les 
potentiels évoqués (ERP) en réponse à des stimuli visuels, avant et après le retour social 
(expression heureuse/accord ou de dégoût/désaccord). Les participants ont été invités à juger la 
couleur d'un carré (la sonde) qui était soit clairement bleu ou vert (sondes distinctes), soit de 
couleur bleue-verte très ambiguë (sondes ambiguës). On leur a également demandé d'indiquer 
leur degré de confiance à l'égard de leurs jugements, après avoir reçu le feed-back social 
  
approuvant ou contestant leurs réponses. Le même stimulus est ensuite présenté à nouveau et les 
participants sont invités à reconsidérer leur décision et leur niveau de confiance subjective. 
Les résultats comportementaux chez les sujets sains, ont montré que les niveaux de confiance 
diminuaient alors que le nombre de révisions augmentait, à la fois en raison de la difficulté de la 
tâche et du feedback social. Cette tendance était renforcée chez les personnes socialement 
anxieuses. Les données de potentiels évoqués ont révélé des différences commençant déjà à 
100ms après la présentation des stimuli ambigus. Ces résultats démontrent une modification 
précoce des processus visuels par une facilitation sensorielle accrue de l'information lorsque les 
sujets se trouvent en situation d’incertitude et sous pression sociale. Cette même configuration 
était réduite chez les sujets anxieux sociaux, ce qui suggère une réduction des processus 
attentionnels précoces aux stimuli ambigus externes en raison d'une focalisation excessive sur 
soi et d'une anticipation de la situation sociale. De plus, les composantes ERP tardives, 
commençant à environ 300 ms, étaient diminuées pour les stimuli distincts par rapport aux 
ambiguës, conformément à une plus grande détection de précision du signal de précision et à des 
expériences métacognitives. 
Dans l’ensemble, les résultats indiquent que la perception inconsciente des stimuli dans 
l’environnement social est modifiée lorsque les sujets sont confrontés à l’incertitude et à la 
pression sociale. Ces processus perceptuels sont atténués dans la population socialement 
anxieuse, alors que les processus métacognitifs commencent plus tard, lorsque les attributs 
physiques des stimuli renvoient vers un sentiment de certitude 
 
Mots-clés : potentiels évoqués, perception visuelle précoce, mécanismes attentionnels 
incertitude, feedback social, métacognition, trouble de l'anxiété sociale.
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1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
The nature of human vision has been extensively investigated in cognitive psychology and more 
recently in the field of neurosciences. Cognitive models such as Marr’s model of visual 
perception (Marr, 1982) or Humphreys & Riddoch’s model (Humphreys & Riddoch, 1987a) 
showed that recognition of stimuli in our environment depends on a hierarchical processing of 
visual information involving sensory, perceptual and cognitive processing. The human brain, first 
analyses the visual elementary properties of stimuli, then forms a percept of the stimulus and 
finally, compare this percept to its memory representations in order to recognise the stimulus. 
Neuroscientific work, using structural and temporal methods, has focalised on these different 
stages of processing in the human brain. Typical questions that were raised have been for 
example, how low-level properties of a stimulus influence behavioural and neuronal outcomes. 
Findings showed that attentional mechanisms had a direct effect on how we perceive information 
in our environment. Since our attentional capacities are limited, salient or threatening stimuli 
capture our attention in an automatic bottom-up manner (e.g. LeDoux, 2000), whereas, controlled 
top-down attentional processes enable to direct our attention towards what we consider relevant 
at a certain time and location, thus involving more effortful orienting processes (e.g. Hopfinger 
& West, 2006). An important question raised in neurosciences, is how does top-down 
endogenous attention interact with bottom-up exogenous attention on visual processing. Results 
have shown that endogenous attention is enhanced in early processing when a stimulus 
discrimination is necessary to perform a task (e.g. Luck, Heinze, Mangun & Hillyard, 1990). 
As social beings, humans are often obliged to perform under social pressure. The field of social 
psychology and social neuroscience, has been largely devoted to the neural and behavioural 
responses to environmental information under social pressure. Thus, the social context in which 
we live may affect, not only people’s thoughts, but also the way we perceive physical stimuli. 
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Additionally, it has been demonstrated that when facing uncertain information, the influence of 
social context is increased (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004), and that this effect is modulated by the 
ability of humans to reconsider their decisions. The latter suggests the involvement of 
metacognitive processes, that is, the processes by which we monitor and control our cognitive 
processes (Frith, 2012).  
The general aim of this thesis is to investigate the electrophysiological correlates associated with 
the processing of ambiguous uncertain stimuli under social pressure. Thus, the early unconscious 
perception and the later metacognitive experiences have been explored under positive and 
negative social feedback within the healthy population as well as across socially anxious 
individuals. 
The work in this thesis has been divided into three parts: a theoretical part, an experimental part 
and a general conclusion. In the theoretical part, we first give an overview of the 
electroencephalographic methodology and we review the main findings in neurosciences across 
the visual, attentional, metacognitive and social fields. At the end of this theoretical part, we 
report the effects of uncertainty and social pressure within socially anxious subjects, giving rise 
to attentional biases.  
The second section of this thesis, the experimental part, includes the three studies that were 
conducted to investigate the temporal dynamics of early perception and metacognition under 
uncertainty and social feedback. The first study focalises on the modulation of early visual ERP 
(event-related potentials) when healthy subjects are under uncertainty and social influence. The 
second study looks at later components in response to this subjective feeling of uncertainty and 
social feedback in order to understand how these aspects influence metacognitive processes. 
Finally, the third study, using the same novel paradigm, explores early visual and attentional 
biases in socially anxious individuals compared to healthy subjects. In this last study, a stressor 
(speech induction) is added prior to the experimental task in order to enhance the effect of 
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uncertainty and social feedback and see the different consequences in these two groups of 
subjects. 
Finally, a general conclusion is presented with the integration of the main findings of the 
experimental part, as well as an overview of the theoretical implications of this thesis. 
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2. THEORETICAL PART 
2.1. EEG and ERP SPECIFICITIES 
Although EEG (electroencephalography) is an old technique to measure brain neural activity 
discovered in the 1930s, the use of ERPs (event-related-potentials) has progressed over the 
last century. In 1929, Hans Berger, was the first to put two electrodes on the surface of the 
scalp. He looked at the difference between these two electrodes and found that there was a 
fluctuation of electrical activity across time (ms). He demonstrated that the human brain’s 
electrical neuronal activity could be measured by placing an electrode on the surface of the 
scalp, and through the amplification of the signal, he could plot the changes in voltage 
(microvolts) over time (Berger, 1929) (Fig. 1). This electrical activity measured on the scalp 
is called an electroencephalogram. However, the EEG is a rough measure of neural brain 
activity and cannot be used in its raw form to measure specific neural processes (Fig. 2). In 
other words, the raw data obtained is made up of several different neural sources of activity 
(Luck, 2014). Thus, in order to isolate the different cognitive processes embedded within the 
EEG, the extraction of neural responses associated with sensory, motor and cognitive activity, 
is required. This is done through averaging techniques that enable to look at the potentials 
related to a particular event, called event-related-potentials (ERPs). The resulting averaged 
ERP waveforms consist of a sequence of positive and negative voltage deflections which are 
called peaks or components, and are labelled P1, N1, P2, N2, P3, N400…indicating positive 
(P) or negative (N) going peaks. The number next to the P or N indicates the position within 
the waveform or the latency of the peak in ms (Fig. 3).  
EEG has a very precise temporal resolution (1ms) compared to hemodynamic measures 
(hundreds of ms), which have a strong spatial resolution in the mm range, but the latter cannot 
match the former in terms of timing (Fig. 4). Compared to behavioural measures, ERPs 
provide an online measure of processing when behaviour responses are impossible. This is 
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called covert measurement of processing. Thus, ERPs can be used to create models of 
distribution of activity over cortical surface. 
 
Figure 1. The discovery of the electroencephalogram (EEG) by Hans Berger in 1929. 
 
Figure 2. Example of EEG raw data 
 
Figure 3. Event-related potentials main components.  
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Figure 4. Temporal resolution in EEG compared to fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging). 
 
2.1.1. PHYSIOLOGICAL BASIS OF ELECTROENCEPHALOGRAPHY 
Neuronal activity is mainly characterised by electrical discharges. EEG measures fluctuations 
in electrical potential on the scalp’s surface resulting from post-synaptic activity when the 
neurotransmitter binds to the receptor, thus changing the flow of ions across the cell 
membrane. Neurons in the brain have a resting potential which is characterised by negative 
potential inside and positive potential outside the cell (Fig. 5). When neurons are activated, 
actions potentials are coming in through the neuron, neurotransmitter is released and goes to 
the post-synaptic neuron (Fig. 6). This process will change the channels and make ions going 
in and out of the extra neuronal space. However, we do not have direct access to the electrical 
activity, as the distance between the electrode and the neuron is too large (Fig. 7). We have 
access to the voltage related to the electrical activity of synchronous activity of parallel 
organised pyramidal cells that together generate a sufficiently strong dipolar field. The 
electrical activity spreads through the brain and passes the skull to the scalp, where it can be 
picked up by electrodes. Scalp ERPs are not produced by action potentials. When postsynaptic 
potentials occur, they create an electrical dipole, thus ERPs can be measured when the dipoles 
of thousands of similarly oriented neurons sum together forming a vector sum.  Because of 
this spatial arrangement, we can detect the activity of synchronously firing neurons. The 
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voltage recorded on the surface of the scalp will be positive on one side of the dipole and 
negative on the other side with a line zero voltage separating the positive and negative sides 
(Luck, 2014). 
As discussed, it is erroneous to attribute any change in potential to the tissue beneath the 
electrode. Nevertheless, the entire neuronal population contributes to produce changes in the 
electrical field measured at the surface of the skull, leading to temporally precise 
measurements of brain activity, while spatial resolution remains quite poor (e.g. Michel, 
Murray, Lantz, Gonzalez, Spinelli & Peralta, 2004). 
 
Figure 5. The resting potential of neurons 
 
Figure 6. Neuronal activity: synaptic transmission 
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Figure 7. Large distance between electrode and neuron: activation of a few neurons is not observable 
on the surface. Large areas need to be active to be seen on the surface. 
 
In sum, EEG is recorded from multiple electrodes distributed across the scalp with a 
conductive gel between each electrode and the skin to make a stable electrical connection. The 
electrical potential (voltage) is recorded from each electrode resulting in a separate waveform 
for each electrode site. This waveform is a mixture of actual brain activity, biological electrical 
potential produced outside the brain (skin, eyes, muscles) and induced activity from external 
devices that is picked up by the head. Thus, in order to get what is related to the task, we need 
to extract the evoked response linked to an event/stimulus (averaging technique). The event-
related-potentials will enable to isolate the temporal activation of cortical processes associated 
with cognitive events (Fig. 8). 
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Figure 8. Example of ERPs. Comparison between two conditions (words vs. images) 
 
2.1.2. EARLY ERP COMPONENTS 
A distinction is made between early exogenous components and late endogenous components.  
Early exogenous components vary according to the physical features of a stimulus and are 
observed early after the presentation of the stimulus. These responses mainly reflect sensory 
information (vision, audition and touch) (Fig. 9). These exogenous sensory components, 
although triggered by the presence of a stimulus, may be modulated by top-down processes. 
The main visual, auditory and somatosensory ERPs are the P1, N1, N170 and P2/N2 
components. The visual P1 and N1 are considered the earliest electrical markers of visual 
processing and are influenced both, by the low-level features of the stimuli (Johannes, Münte, 
Heinze & Mangun, 1995) and by attentional processes (Luck et al., 1990).  The P1 is an 
occipital component peaking at around 100 ms after stimulus presentation. It is generated in 
the extrastriate visual area (V1) and reflects early sensory processing for stimuli presented in 
a location where attention is focused whereas, the N1, peaking between 100 ms and 200 ms, 
represents the orienting of attention to a task-relevant stimulus (Luck et al., 1990). However, 
there are several visual N1 subcomponents contributing to the same deflection. The anterior 
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N1 peaks earlier than the two posterior ones (parietal and lateral occipital), but both are 
influenced by spatial attention (e.g. Hillyard & Anllo-Vento, 1998) as well as task 
discrimination (e.g. Vogel & Luck, 2000).  
The N170 component, peaking between 150 ms and 200 ms after stimulus onset, is a face-
sensitive component assumed to be generated in occipito-temporal cortex and posterior 
fusiform gyrus (e.g. Bötzel, Schulze & Stodieck, 1995). It reflects sensory perceptual stages 
of face processing for subsequent face recognition (Eimer, 2000). Section 2.2.3 (ERP data 
from visual perception and early attention) will discuss the main visual components in further 
details. Section 2.2.4.2 (ERP data from face perception) discusses the main components in 
face recognition. 
The P2 component, peaking between 200 ms and 300 ms, is at the boundary between 
exogenous and endogenous processes (Luck, 2014). This component is usually larger for 
target features and enhanced when targets are rare (Luck & Hillyard, 1994). This component 
indexes attention oriented towards certain features of objects (Hermann & Knight, 2001). 
Finally, the N2, peaking between 200 ms and 300 ms, is usually observed for deviant stimuli 
and auditory mismatches at anterior sites (for a review see: Folstein & Van Petten, 2008). 
 
Figure 9. Sensory evoked potentials 
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2.1.3. LATE ERP COMPONENTS 
Late endogenous components are observed at later stages of conscious processing and can or 
cannot take place for a particular stimulus depending on the degree of attention allocation of 
the subject. These responses reflect cognitive treatment (Fig. 10), and are entirely dependent 
on the task. The main endogenous components are the P3, N400 and the late posterior 
positivity (LPP). Concerning the P3, there are several components that have been identified 
in the time range between 300 ms and 450 ms (for a review, see: Polich 2004; 2012). Mainly, 
the P3, a positive-going deflection on midline sites (Donchi & Coles, 1988) has been 
associated with stimulus predictability (Picton, 1992), allocation of additional attentional 
resources and task difficulty (e.g. Isreal, Chesney, Wickens & Donchin, 1980), stimulus 
categorisation and post categorisation processes (Kutas, McCarthy & Donchin, 1977; Polich 
& Bondurant, 1997) and more recently, with expectancy towards outcome  (Zhou, Yu & Zhou, 
2010), feedback valence (Hajcak, Holroyd, Moser & Simons, 2005) and variations in 
perceptual certainty (Selimbeyoglu, Keskin-Ergen &Demiralp, 2012), as well as 
metacognitive awareness (Murphy, Robertson, Harty & O’Connell, 2015; Desender, Van 
Opstal, Hughes & Van den Bussche, 2016) and post-decision accumulation of sensory 
evidence that leads to a judgement (Murphy et al., 2015; Kelly & O’Connell, 2013; Twomey, 
Murphy, Kelly & O’Connell, 2015). Thus, P3 is highly dependent on the experimental 
manipulation. 
Concerning the N400, this component has been associated to situations of semantic violations 
of meaning (Kutas & Hillyard, 1980). However, recent research in social neurosciences have 
found an N400 for context violations suggesting that this semantic-related component extends 
beyond language (e.g. Amaruso, Gelormini, Aboitiz, Gonzalez, Manes, Cardona & Ibanez, 
2013).  
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The LPP, a midline ERP starting at around 300 ms after stimulus onset and lasting up to 600 
ms, has mainly been linked to cognitive strategies of emotional regulation (e.g. Hajcak, 
MacNamara & Olvet, 2010). It reflects interactions of bottom-up attentional allocation and 
top-down sustained elaboration (e.g. Weinberg, Ferri & Hajcak, 2013). 
 
Figure 10. Example of cognitive evoked potentials: the brain can differentiate between what is regular 
(F; frequent stimulus), what is rare (R) and what is deviant (mismatch negativity).  
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2.2. VISUAL PERCEPTION AND ATTENTION 
2.2.1. BRAIN STRUCTURES INVOLVED IN VISUAL PERCEPTION  
Occipital structures are the beginning of visual processing but visual mechanisms extend 
beyond the striate cortex. Visual regions are hierarchically organised (Hubel & Wiesel, 1962) 
with parallel and interconnecting pathways at each level to account for a progressive increase 
in complexity (Felleman & Van Essen, 1991) (Fig. 11). The information spreads from the 
primary visual area V1 (striate cortex) to higher order visual areas. Thus, V1 is the first 
processing level in the distributed hierarchy. It receives the largest input from the lateral 
geniculate nucleus of the thalamus and projects to all other occipital areas. V2 (pre-striate 
cortex) is the second level and it is a mirror image map of V1. Striate and extra-striate areas 
in humans (V1 and V2) are sensitive to shapes and spatial orientations. After V2, parallel 
pathways go to the parietal cortex, inferior temporal cortex and superior temporal sulcus. 
Object recognition as well as colour recognition takes place in the ventral pathway (temporal 
lobe) whereas visual action takes place in the dorsal stream (parietal lobe) (Mishkin, 
Ungerleider & Macko, 1983) (Fig. 12). Accordingly, from V1 and V2 areas, the information 
either goes to V4, where cells respond to colour, or to V3, which is sensitive to the shape of 
objects in motion, or to V5, which hosts neurons sensitive to segments that move (Kolb & 
Wishaw, 2009). As we go forward towards anterior regions, neurons respond to more and 
more complex refined stimuli.  
Neuropsychological research has shown that selective lesions in the hierarchy produce 
specific deficits in visual processing. For example, patients with damage to V4, will see the 
world in shades of grey and will not be able to recall colours neither to imagine them 
(Meadows, 1974; Sacks & Wasserman, 1987), whereas lesions to V5 will produce an inability 
to perceive objects in movement (Schenk, Ellison, Rice & Milner, 2005).  
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However, visual processing does not end in secondary areas (V3, V4, V5). Several visual 
regions in temporal and parietal lobes respond to complex stimuli. For instance, within the 
temporal lobe, the fusiform face area is responsible for face recognition, the extrastriate body 
area for body analysis, the superior temporal sulcus for biological motion, the lateral occipital 
area for object analysis and the parahippocampal place area for the analysis of landmarks 
(Kolb & Wishaw, 2009).  Lesions to specific regions in temporal cortex will result in specific 
agnosia, this is the incapacity to analyse or recognise objects or familiar faces without any 
impairment of visual primary system. Nevertheless, I will not go into further details on these 
neuropsychological visual deficits as it is not relevant to the purpose of this thesis. 
 
Figure 11. Hierarchy of visual regions showing a densely interconnected network hierarchically 
organised with feedforward and feedback connections. This hierarchy shows 32 visual cortical areas 
as well as subcortical visual stages (retinal ganglion cell layer and the lateral genicular nucleus) plus 
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several non-visual areas such as the somatosensory cortex (7b), perirhinal area (36), and the 
hippocampal complex. These areas are connected by 187 linkages, most of which have been 
demonstrated to be reciprocal pathways. 
 
 
Figure 12.  Visual pathways in the human brain. The parietal cortex (dorsal stream) controls the 
voluntary orienting of attention towards a location of interest. The ventral stream is involved with 
object and visual identification and recognition. The STS (superior temporal sulcus) separates the 
superior temporal gyrus from the middle temporal gyrus and it involved with the identification human 
biological motion and specific social inputs suggesting its role in social perception. 
 
2.2.2. BRAIN STRUCTURES INVOLVED IN ATTENTION 
Bottom-up attention or exogenous attention is captured by the stimuli features, as opposed to 
top-down attention (endogenous attention), in which visual attention will be oriented on the 
basis of our expectations, knowledge and objectives. Thus, there is a functional segregation 
of cortical pathways for bottom-up and top-down attention (Corbetta, Kincade, Ollinger, 
McAvoy & Shulman, 2000) (Fig. 13). 
The ventral pathway responds to unexpected or deviant events. Regions within the ventral 
stream inhibit parietal regions, whereas, the dorsal pathway identifies the localisation (goal-
oriented) and gets activated when attention is reoriented in space, as well as when a specific 
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localisation is selected. Thus, fronto-parietal regions are activated in focalised attention 
(Corbetta et al., 2000). 
Visual search paradigms have been used to test attention competition in laboratory settings 
(e.g. Theeuwes, 1994). In these tasks, subjects are required to search for a target among 
distractors. When targets are salient in terms of shape and colour, bottom-up activations are 
generated based on the differences in stimulus features (singleton detection). When targets are 
similar to distractors, the searching is done in a serial manner involving top-down processes 
(Bacon & Egeth, 1994). Thus, the parietal cortex is activated for attention to location and the 
occipito-temporal cortex is activated for attention to features such as colour and shape 
(Treisman & Gelade, 1980). Moreover, several frontal regions, mainly the anterior cingulate, 
are involved when attentional effort is required (Kolb & Wishaw, 2009).  Consequently, 
sensory processing is affected by early exogenous and late endogenous mechanisms of 
attention that interact according to task manipulations. Exogenous attention is oriented more 
rapidly whereas endogenous attention requires more cognitive resources involving a larger 
attentional network including frontal eye fields, intraparietal sulcus, superior temporal gyrus 
and anterior cingulate (Hopfinger & West, 2006). 
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Figure 13. Cortical pathways involved in bottom-up and top-down- attention: The dorsal system is 
bilateral and composed of the intraparietal sulcus (IPS) and the junction of the precentral and superior 
frontal sulcus (frontal eye field, FEF) in each hemisphere. It is involved in voluntary (top-down) 
attention. The ventral system is right-lateralised and composed of the right temporal parietal junction 
(TPJ) and the right ventral frontal cortex (VFC). This system is involved in bottom-up capture 
attention. 
 
2.2.3. ERP DATA FROM VISUAL PERCEPTION AND EARLY ATTENTION 
As mentioned in the previous section, regions activated during attention suggest separable 
endogenous and exogenous attentional systems implying different stages of processing that 
electroencephalography can clarify. Thus, we would expect to observe distinct stages of 
processing preceding conscious attention. Nevertheless, EEG studies have shown that both 
mechanisms interact (e.g. Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Hopfinger & West, 2006) as 
endogenous mechanisms modulate activity in neurons coding the spatial location (Bisley & 
Goldberg, 2003) suggesting a unitary focus of attention with top-down influences on 
18 
 
exogenous orientation (Folk, Remington & Johnston, 1992). For example, Hopfinger & 
Mangun (1998) showed that exogenous attention enhances the visual early P1 component and 
this same stage of processing can also be enhanced by endogenous attention when converged 
at the same location. These results suggest that visual ERPs are strongly modulated by 
attention-related activity. Consequently, top-down neural mechanisms such as directed 
attention may increase or decrease brain activity related to visual processing affecting the 
amplitudes of the visual P1 component, whereas, the N1 amplitudes are enhanced only by 
endogenous attention (Hopfinger & West, 2006). These findings are of great relevance for the 
upcoming studies of the present thesis and suggest a functional dissociation of P1 and N1 
components. Indeed, Luck et al. (1990) showed that the P1 indexed a facilitation of sensory 
information for stimuli presented to a location where attention was focused, whereas, the N1 
represented the orienting of attention to task- relevant stimuli. 
Following the anterior N1 wave, two visual/attentional components are observed, the P2 and 
the N2. The P2 is a positive-going centro-parietal potential, peaking at around 200ms after 
stimulus onset, and represents some aspects of higher-order perceptual processes modulated 
by attention (Luck & Hillyard, 1994).  This component is larger for targets and is enhanced 
for infrequent targets (Luck, 2004). Finally, the anterior N2 sensitive to the anterior cingulate, 
has been associated to conflicting responses. For instance, within a social context, the N2 is 
enhanced for negative or deviant feedback (e.g. Carretié, Hinojosa, Martin-Loeches, Mercado 
& Tapia 2004; Daffner, Scinto, Calvo, Faust, Mesulam, West & Holcomb, 2000). 
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2.2.4. EMOTIONAL FACE PERCEPTION 
Face perception can be considered as the most developed visual perceptual skill in humans 
suggesting a special status for face processing (Ishai, 2008). Faces provide additional social 
information based on the perception of changeable aspects of the face such as the expression 
and eye gaze (Haxby, Hoffman & Gobbini, 2000). The face perception system encompasses 
invariant aspects of a face that allow to recognise the identity, and changeable aspects which 
facilitate social communication (gaze, expression and lip movement). Thus, the changeable 
aspects of faces underlie the perception of information that facilitates social communication. 
These two processes proceed in a relatively independent manner and constitute the core 
system. Thus, the core system is responsible for the visual analysis of faces whereas another 
system, the extended system, processes the meaning of information in a face such as the 
emotions (Haxby et al., 2000; Haxby, Hoffman & Gobbini, 2002). Bruce & Young (1986), 
proposed two parallel routes underlying face expressions and identity processing. These routes 
work independently allowing the processing of expression without the processing of identity 
(Breen, Caine & Colheart, 2000). Neuropsychological data supports this model by showing in 
some prosopagnosic patients an ability to recognise expressions (Damasio, Damasio & Van 
Hoesen, 1982), whereas other patients show intact identity recognition but impaired 
processing of facial expressions. For example, damage to the insula impairs recognition of 
disgust (Calder, Keane, Manes, Antoun & Young, 2000). 
 
2.2.4.1. BRAIN STRUCTURES INVOLVED IN FACE PERCEPTION 
The extraction of face information relies on the activation and interaction of several brain 
structures. The changing aspects in face perception generate activity in the superior temporal 
sulcus (STS), whereas the perception of identity activates the lateral fusiform gyrus whose 
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activation is usually bilateral and consistently on the right (Ishai, 2008; Hoffman & Haxby, 
2000; Haxby et al., 2000) (see Fig. 14).  
For the purpose of the studies completed in this thesis, I will focus on the brain regions 
activated during facial expressions. The expression on another’s face provides information 
about the emotional state of that person and can trigger this emotion in oneself (Haxby et al., 
2002). Hemodynamic responses show activation of the inferior occipital gyrus, fusiform 
gyrus, STS and inferior frontal gyrus when seeing facial expressions compared to neutral ones. 
Moreover, the right STS is more activated when perceiving averted gaze faces compared to 
direct gaze faces, suggesting distinct neural systems for gaze direction and expressions (Engell 
& Haxby, 2007).  A significant enhanced activity in the fusiform extrastriate areas is 
associated with the four basic emotions (fear, disgust, happiness and sadness), and these 
responses are increased for fear and disgust compared to happiness and sadness. The 
perception of fear also evokes a response in the amygdala as well as in regions involved in 
social and cognitive responses, such as the STS, cingulate and parietal regions (Vuilleumier 
& Pourtois, 2007). The perception of disgust in the face of another activates the anterior insula 
but not the amygdala, and strong disgust also activates regions associated with the limbic 
cortico-striatal-thalamic circuit (Phillips, Young, Senior, Brammer, Andrews, Calder, 
Bullmore, Perret, Rowland, Williams, Gray & David, 1997). Another neural system involved 
in the perception of happy emotions is the orbitofrontal cortex associated with reward and 
social reinforcement (Haxby et al., 2002).  
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Figure 14. Model of the distributed human neural system for face perception (Haxby et al 2000). 
Interaction of two systems: the core system enabling visual analysis of faces with activity in superior 
temporal sulcus for the encoding of changeable aspects and activity in lateral fusiform gyrus for the 
encoding of identity; the extended system allowing the extraction of complementary features. 
 
 
2.2.4.2. ERP DATA FROM FACE PERCEPTION 
From an electroencephalographic point of view, a wealth of ERP studies of face perception 
has consistently shown an evoked potential at around 170 ms at posterior sites called the N170. 
This component is observed after the presentation of human upright faces as well as for 
inverted faces but not for non-face stimuli such as cars, butterflies or animal faces. Inverted 
faces show a delay in the N170 response relative to upright faces. This response to faces is 
larger over right hemisphere leads. The fact that the N170 is present for both, upright and 
inverted faces suggests that this response is not associated with face recognition, as it is not 
modulated by familiarity neither by emotional expressions, but only by the structural encoding 
of visual stimuli that enable to categorise a stimulus as a face (Bentin, Allison, Puce, Perez & 
McCarthy, 1996). Additionally, when presenting isolated face components, the N170 is also 
enhanced corroborating the interpretation of this ERP as an early detection of structural 
features characterising human faces. Moreover, the N170 response is larger for isolated eyes 
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relative to the whole face indicating that the neural mechanisms generating N170 responses 
are specific to eyes. 
When presenting famous and non-famous faces, the N170 is unaffected. Face recognition 
occurs later, at around 250 ms (N250) over lateral occipito-temporal sites and is only observed 
for known faces compared to familiar ones (Gosling & Eimer, 2011). Thus, the N170 precedes 
face recognition and the N250 underlies neural generators in the face specific regions of the 
fusiform gyrus (Schweinberger, Pickering, Jentzsch, Burton & Kaufmann, 2002) suggesting 
an activation of stored long-term representations of famous faces. Additionally, famous faces 
elicit a sustained positivity around 600 ms. This longer latency positivity for famous faces is 
not linked to familiarity but to explicit face identification (Gosling & Eimer, 2011). 
Concerning emotional expressions, ERP results are contradictory. Some authors have shown 
an enhanced frontocentral P200 for fearful expressions and an enhanced P3 for disgusted face 
expressions, but no N170 modulations (Ashley, Vuilleumier & Swick, 2004). These findings 
suggest that structural encoding and expression processing are independent processes (Eimer 
& Holmes, 2003). In contrast, other research (Batty & Taylor, 2003) have explored the timing 
of processing of basic emotions in implicit emotional tasks and observed significant effects 
starting at around 100 ms (P1) as well as differences in amplitude and latency at around 140 
ms, indicating that the N170 is sensitive to emotions suggesting an early automatic encoding 
of emotional faces. The authors interpret these results as a facilitated identification due to the 
activation of a subcortical pathway when presented with relevant emotions. Moreover, they 
found later N170 latencies for negative emotions compared to neutral and positive ones which 
are explained by additional information sent from the subcortical pathway to ventral regions 
(Batty & Taylor, 2003; Garvert, Friston, Dolan & Garrido, 2014). It seems, though, that the 
experimental task as well as the instructions influence the processing of emotional faces. For 
example, Ratner & Amodio (2013) showed larger N170 amplitudes to ingroup faces compared 
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to outgroup faces, suggesting top-down effects on early perception when subjects are required 
to focus attention on the social significance of the stimuli compared to passive viewing. This 
interpretation is corroborated by Holmes et al. (Holmes, Vuilleumier & Eimer (2003) as they 
found an enhanced N170 for attended faces whereas emotional faces outside the attentional 
focus did not trigger any emotional expression effects at these early stages of processing. We 
can conclude that affective valence and arousal work independently (Olofsson, Nordin, 
Sequeira & Polich, 2008). 
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2.3. METACOGNITION AND UNCERTAINTY 
Metacognition refers to the processes by which we monitor and control our cognitive 
processes (Frith, 2012). It represents the top of the hierarchy of control over cognitive 
processes. In our everyday life, we are constantly pushed to make decisions involving two or 
more options.  It seems thus important to be able to quickly evaluate the adequacy of a 
response and monitor our behaviour accordingly. Evaluation and monitoring are two aspects 
underlying the concept of metacognition (Proust, 2014), defined as cognition about cognition 
(Shea, Boldt, Bang, Yeung, Heyes & Frith, 2014), which ranges on a continuum from total 
uncertainty to complete certainty. At these extremes lies pathological behaviour. Excessive 
doubt is related to mental disorders such as obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), while 
overconfidence, might be the manifestation of psychosis (Ron, Oren & Dar, 2016). In healthy 
individuals, such extremes are rarely reached but these reflective processes are nevertheless 
subject to inter-individual differences (Song, Kanai, Fleming, Weil, Schwarzkopf & Rees, 
2011; Rouault, McWilliams, Allen & Fleming, 2018) and are sensitive to the degree of 
ambiguity of the stimulus sensory information (Selimbeyoglu et al., 2012; Yeung & 
Summerfield, 2012).   
Recently, related metacognitive processes have been explored in signal detection and reaction 
time tasks (Fleming, Dolan & Frith, 2012) and focalised on error detection resulting in 
increased reaction times and behavioural measures such as judgment revisions. However, error 
detection may occur without explicit awareness. Thus, two forms of metacognition exist: an 
implicit form characterised by rapidity and automatism without awareness and an explicit 
form characterised by self-monitoring and awareness (Frith, 2012). The latter corresponds to 
reportable knowledge about our behaviour in decision making and represents the aspect of 
metacognition we are interested here, as it creates the experience of agency (Moretto, Walsh 
& Haggard, 2011), enhances social interactions by communicating our thoughts to others and 
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enables the engagement in mentalising, a crucial aspect of theory of mind (Wellman, Cross & 
Watson, 2001). For example, deficits in metacognitive ability have been observed in 
schizophrenia. These patients have difficulties in detecting whether they have made an error 
and present poor neurocognitive function resulting in a lack of social cognitive ability 
(Lysaker, Leonhardt, Pijnenborg, van Donkersgoed, de Jong & Dimaggio, 2014), as well as 
overconfidence and delusional symptoms. By opposition, patients suffering from obsessive 
compulsive disorder manifest acute doubt as a result of deficient conviction and feeling of 
knowing (Ron et al., 2016; Szechtman & Woody, 2004). Thus, judgements of uncertainty in 
humans involve metacognition (Fleming et al., 2012). In healthy adults, perceptual 
metacognitive efficiency declines with age which supports the link between metacognition 
and executive function (Palmer, David & Fleming, 2014). 
 
 2.3.1. BRAIN STRUCTURES INVOLVED IN METACOGNITION 
Aspects of metacognition such as monitoring and control of cognitive processes are closely 
linked to working memory and executive control (Shimamura, 2000). These processes take 
place in prefrontal cortex. Indeed, activation in prefrontal medial cortex is associated with 
subsequent conforming behavioural adjustments (Shestakova, Rieskamp, Tugin, Ossadtchi, 
Krutitskaya and Klucharev, 2012). Neuropsychological data corroborates these findings as 
prefrontal lesions disrupt metacognitive judgements about perception (Shimamura, 2000; Del 
Cul, Dehaene, Reyes, Bravo & Slachevsky, 2009). However, recent research has shown that 
retrospective and prospective judgments are associated with distinct neural substrates 
(Fleming & Dolan, 2012). Retrospective monitoring refers to the ability to evaluate the 
adequacy of a response and is associated with activity in anterior and dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex, whereas prospective judgements, that is, the ability to evaluate the capacity to perform 
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a future cognitive task, is linked to activity in medial prefrontal cortex (Proust, 2013; Fleming 
& Dolan, 2012). Methods for investigating the neural components of retrospective and 
prospective metacognition differ (Fleming et al., 2012; Fleming & Dolan, 2012). The former 
is measured with subjective confidence ratings about the decision whereas the latter is 
measured with subjective judgements about the ability to learn (see Arbuckle & Cuddy, 1969) 
and feelings of knowing (see Hart, 1965), occurring after task completion. Prospective 
metacognition involves memory processes and future imagery, thus, this aspect of 
metacognition also implies increased connectivity with medial temporal lobe (Schnyers, 
Nicholls & Verfaellie, 2005). 
The contribution of prefrontal cortex to metacognition is associated with task uncertainty as a 
consequence of self-generated information processes and attention to internal representations 
(Yoshida & Ishii, 2006). Accordingly, the role of uncertainty to optimise decision making is 
crucial to metacognitive experiences (Fiser, Berkes, Orbán & Lengyel, 2010). 
 
2.3.2. ERP DATA FROM METACOGNITION 
Electrophysiologically, most studies have focalised exclusively on the error-related negativity 
(ERN), a negative ongoing wave appearing after the subjects’ response and peaking at around 
100 ms (for a review see: Larson, Clayson & Clawson, 2014). This ERP component originates 
in the anterior cingulate cortex (e.g. Holroyd & Coles, 2002). The ERN appears in speeded 
reaction time tasks in which errors are mostly caused by impulsive responding because of the 
limited response time (Selimbeyoglu et al., 2012). Thus, this ERP is associated with conflict 
detection but not with regulative control processes such as the allocation of attentional 
resources allowing dynamic behavioural adjustments. For that, other components, locked to 
the stimulus and associated with the processing of different stages of attention, such as the P2 
and the P3 (Herman & Knight, 2001) need to be examined. As mentioned in the previous 
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section, evidence from neuropsychology shows that patients with damage to the anterior 
medial prefrontal cortex have impaired self-reflection, suggesting that this process relies 
strongly on anterior areas (Shimamura, 2000; Fleming et al., 2012). These studies showed that 
high executive control in terms of attentional resources lead to increased self-reflective 
processes.  
Few studies have explored the temporal dynamics of metacognition indexed by an additional 
allocation of attentional resources internally oriented, that is, controlled attention leading to 
increased self-reflective processes. A recent study (Desender et al., 2016) investigated activity 
from metacognitive processes and showed that recategorising an ambiguous stimulus 
followed by a disputing social feedback required additional attention that is necessary for 
improved control over a response. The authors found an increased P3 amplitude and proposed 
that this component in situations of ambiguity and social conflict could be the neural correlate 
of metacognitive awareness as explicit awareness goes beyond one’s ability to discriminate 
between one’s correct and incorrect responses. Indeed, the P3 component has been shown to 
be increased under high demanding tasks and decreased under less demanding tasks (Kok, 
2001; Olofsson & Polich, 2007). Studies investigating the relationship between the P3 and the 
participants’ level of uncertainty/ certainty induced by task difficulty found that P3 builds up 
as sensory evidence increases (Kelly & O’Connell, 2013; Murphy et al., 2015; Twomey et al., 
2015). Consequently, we can conclude that increased perceptual difficulty necessitates greater 
attentional engagement leading to an increased P3 component. In contrast, less demanding 
tasks would induce immediately a higher feeling of certainty preventing P3 amplitude to 
increase (Zanesco, Tipura, Clément & Pegna, 2019). 
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2.4. SOCIAL INFLUENCE AND SOCIAL CONFLICT  
The attempt to understand and explain how thoughts and behaviours of individuals are 
influenced by the presence of others started with the study of social influence about 70 years 
ago. Social life is characterised by conflict and controversy in which individuals try to change 
the thoughts and behaviours of others. The normative social aspects have regulated the 
behaviour in human interactions and yielded social pressure creating conformity at a public 
level, yet not always at a private level. Thus, in the recent years, researchers have tried to 
explore social influence processes that are indirect and nonconscious (for a review see: 
Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). This work has been done in laboratory using neuroscientific 
methods, such as fMRI and electroencephalography. 
 
2.4.1. BRAIN STRUCTURES INVOLVED IN SOCIAL CONFLICT 
Over the course of the last decade, a large number of studies in social neurosciences have 
examined the neurocognitive correlates of social influence (for reviews see: Izuma, 2013). 
These studies have used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and have focused on 
the brain networks implicated in social conformity- the act of changing one’s behaviour to 
match the responses of others (Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004) - as well as in the subsequent 
changes in behaviour. Disagreement with group opinion is associated with activity in posterior 
medial frontal cortex (pMFC), specifically, the rostral cingulate and the anterior insula as well 
as deactivation of ventral striatum (Klucharev, Hytönen, Rijpkema, Smidts and Fernández, 
2009; Berns, Capra, Moore and Noussair, 2009). Individuals with a stronger tendency towards 
conformity show higher activation of pMFC and insula (Berns et al., 2009).  Agreement with 
group opinion induces activity in ventral frontostriatal circuity implicated in the anticipation 
of reward (Wu & Zhi, 2016; Galvan, Hare, Davidson, Spicer, Glover and Casey, 2005), 
particularly the nucleus accumbens (Knutson and Cooper,2005). This activity in the striatum 
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is selectively enhanced when participants conform to the ingroup as compared to the outgroup 
(Stallen, Smidts and Stanfey, 2013).  
It is thought that pMFC activation reflects a prediction-error signal implicated in 
reinforcement learning (Klucharev et al., 2009; Shestakova et al., 2012; Kim, Liss, Rao, Singer 
and Compton, 2012; Campbell-Meiklejohn, Bach, Roepstorff, Dolan and Frith, 2010), which 
subjects try to decrease by adjusting their subsequent behaviour (Klucharev et al., 2009; Mars, 
Coles, Grol, Holroyd, Nieuwenhuis, Hulstijn and Toni, 2005;  Holroyd and Coles, 2002; 
Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone and Nieuwenhuis, 2004).  
An important point should be emphasised which is that, these studies have focused on the 
regulatory processes required when individuals are presented with incongruent social 
feedback. Such adaptive cognitive control suggests the implication of higher cortical areas 
associated with executive functions. However, to investigate whether a group opinion 
modulates not only self-reported preference but also its neural representation (Izuma, 2013), 
one needs to distinguish between private acceptance (i.e. genuine change in one’s attitude to 
match the group) and public compliance (i.e. expressive form of conformity) (Cialdini and 
Goldstein, 2004). Changes in activation in the striatum and ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
(VMPFC) have been associated with changes in self-preference, reflecting private acceptance 
(Zaki, Schirmer and Mitchell, 2011). These regions track subjects’ preferences for various 
stimuli (Klucharev et al., 2009; Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2010; Zaki et al., 2011; Izuma, 
Matsumoto, Murayama, Samejima, Sadato  and Matsumoto, 2010).  They seem to encode the 
subjective value associated with the processing of reward, thus constituting a valuation system 
(Bartra, McGuire and Kable, 2013).  
One way by which neurosciences research may contribute to elucidate whether conformity 
occurs at an explicit level or whether it influences individuals’ actual perception is by 
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investigating the effect of group opinion on the presentation of visual stimuli.  Few studies 
have examined the impact of conformity at low-level perceptual and attentional processes as 
opposed to a decision taken at an executive level (Trautmann-Lengsfeld and Herrmann, 2013; 
Berns, Chappelow, Zink, Pagnoni, Martin-Skurski and Richards, 2005; Stapel and Koomen, 
1997). Asch (1951) already raised the possibility that social pressure could alter perception 
(Asch, 1951). Berns et al. (2005), using fMRI, provided the first evidence for alterations in 
perceptual processes (i.e. in occipito-parietal networks) when subjects were confronted with 
incorrect peer feedback regarding the degree of rotation of an abstract figure. However, the 
limited temporal resolution of hemodynamic measures does not allow to determine if this 
posterior activation is associated with early or late processes. Yet the temporal characteristics 
would facilitate the understanding of this activity by indicating whether this activity arises 
rapidly, or long after higher cortical areas.    
 
2.4.2. ERP DATA FROM SOCIAL CONFLICT 
In line with this idea of conflict monitoring and error processing, recent 
electroencephalography (EEG) studies (Shestakova et al., 2012; Chen, Wu, Tong, Guan and 
Zhou, 2012) showed that the activity in pMFC, sensitive to prediction error, generates a 
negative deflection, called feedback-related negativity (FRN) or medial frontal negativity 
(MFN), which peaks between 200 ms and 400 ms at frontocentral sites after the presentation 
of the social cue (Shestakova et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2012; Long, Jiang and Zhou, 2012). The 
FRN appears after negative feedback and is similar to the response-locked error-related 
negativity (ERN) which typically appears in speeded reaction time tasks following response 
errors (Walsh and Anderson, 2012). Dipole source models indicate that the topography of the 
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ERN and FRN components is consistent with activity in the anterior cingulate (Dehaene, 
Posner and Tucker, 1994; Gruendler, Ullsperger and Huster, 2011).  
Substantial research has addressed how face processing can be biased by social factors. 
Results show that P1 and the face - sensitive N170 ERP components are maximum when the 
combination of co-emitted social cues clearly represent a threat for the participant (i.e. anger 
associated with direct gaze) suggesting a sensory system specifically optimised for 
biologically relevant stimuli (El Zein, Gamond, Conty and Grèzes, 2015). Similarly, group 
membership cues may change the way we see a face (Ratner & Amodio, 2013). Studies 
assessing the influence of social group membership (i.e. ingroup/outgroup) on early stages of 
face processing show a larger N170 to ingroup faces than to outgroup faces (Ratner & Amodio, 
2013; Ibáñez, Gleichgerrcht, Hurtado, González, Haye and Manes, 2010). The differential and 
early effects of social cues and group membership on early ERP components suggest that 
relevant social information is analysed rapidly and effectively by the brain.  
However, only two ERP studies have investigated the influence of social context on early 
perceptual processes for non-face stimuli (Trautmann-Lengsfeld & Herrmann, 2013; Zanesco, 
Tipura, Posadas, Clément & Pegna, 2018). The findings showed that social influence can have 
a top-down effect on these early perceptual processes. In Trautmann-Lengsfeld & Herrmann’s 
(2013) study, participants showed a larger P1 amplitude when they conformed to the correct 
group opinion compared to situations where they conformed to the incorrect one. The authors 
did not find any significant differences in P1 amplitude when participants adapted to the 
incorrect opinion compared to conditions where they did not. The difference became evident 
at 150 ms, with the analysis of the N1 component, which reflects the orientation of attention 
towards task relevant stimuli (Luck et al., 1990). In our study (Zanesco et al., 2018), ERPs 
were measured to ambiguous and distinct stimuli before and after social feedback. Results 
showed an increase in P1 amplitude for ambiguous stimuli following a disputed feedback with 
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no effect on distinct stimuli, corroborating the fact that social influence is most effective under 
situations of uncertainty induced by task difficulty (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). 
 
2.5. SOCIAL ANXIETY DISORDER  
According to the categorical approach from the DSM-V (APA, 2013), social anxiety disorder 
is characterised by a constant and intense fear in social situation when the person is observed 
by others, a fear that others will notice their anxiety signs and an avoidance of social situations. 
These aspects persist more than six months and affect their daily functioning.  
The DSM criteria represents social anxious responses to social situations but do not take into 
account the causes of the disorder. In order to understand the underlying mechanisms of social 
anxiety, several cognitive models have been proposed based on behavioural and neural 
responses during the performance of experimental tasks. 
 
2.5.1. COGNITIVE MECHANISMS INVOLVED IN SOCIAL ANXIETY 
Attentional bias towards threat is a key phenomenon observed in all experimental tasks and 
across all anxiety disorders (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg & van 
Ijzendoorn, 2007; MacLeod, Mathews & Tata, 1986; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Williams, 
Mathews & MacLeod, 1996). An attentional bias towards threat refers to a strong selective 
and automatic attentional allocation to threatening social stimuli such as human face emotions. 
Different components of attentional bias can be observed in experimental tasks such as 
facilitated and faster detection of threatening social stimuli, difficulty to disengage attention 
from threatening social stimuli and a tendency to avoid the threatening stimuli by allocating 
attention towards an opposite location (for a review see: Cisler & Koster, 2010). Most ERP 
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studies in social anxious disorder (SAD) suggest that this early attentional bias is reflected by 
an enhanced P1 to socially threatening stimuli (e.g. Peschard, Philippot, Joassin & Rossignol, 
2013; Rossignol, Philippot, Bissot, Rigoulot & Campanella., 2012; Rossignol, Campanella, 
Bissot, Philippot, 2013; Mueller, Hofmann, Santesso, Meuret, Bitran & Pizzagalli., 2009; 
Morel, George, Foucher, Chammat & Dubal, 2014). These studies have focalised on the 
response to emotional faces but haven’t taken into account the anticipatory processing, which 
seems to play a role in SAD (Clark & Wells, 1995; Deiters, Stevens, Hermann & Gerlach, 
2013; Sluis, Boschen, Neumann & Murphy, 2017).  
The neurocognitive mechanisms underlying these attentional biases components include a 
rapid, automatic and unconscious fear pathway mediated by the amygdala (Ohman, 2005; 
LeDoux, 2000) which enhances selective attention towards threatening social stimuli. At a 
higher order strategic level, the attentional control theory (ACT; Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos 
& Calvo, 2007), postulates three executive components that seem to mediate the ability to 
disengage from threatening stimuli (Berggren & Derakshan, 2013). The first, inhibition, 
defined as the ability to suppress task-irrelevant information, whose impairment can be 
observed by an increased antisaccade latency in socially anxious individuals leading to a 
reduction in top-down control in inhibiting reflexive processes (Derakshan & Eysenck, 2009). 
Additionally, socially anxious individuals show an increased attentional capture by irrelevant 
stimuli (Poy, Eixarch & Avila, 2004) and an increased interference for task-irrelevant 
distractors (Pacheco-Unguetti, Acosta, Callejas & Lupiañez, 2010).  The second executive 
aspect is shifting, this is, a reduced capacity to shift attention in a flexible manner between 
relevant task demands. In this sense, socially anxious individuals are slower in task requiring 
to switch (e.g. Wisconsin Card Sorting Task; Goodwin & Sher, 1992), thus showing a lower 
performance than non-anxious individuals. Finally, impaired updating is also observed in 
socially anxious subjects, which is the inability to update and monitor representation in 
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working memory. For example, in n-back tasks, socially anxious subjects make more errors 
than non-socially subjects (MacLeod & Donnellan, 1993). 
Concerning threat avoidance in socially anxious individuals, only one cognitive model 
(Williams, Watts, McLeod & Mathews, 1998) includes this component in their predictions. 
The authors propose that a resource allocation mechanism (RAM) directs attention away from 
threat. Nevertheless, this may work for minor threats but not for severe threats, independently 
of a subject’s level of anxiety. 
While most of the findings agree with excessive attention to socially threatening information 
in socially anxious individuals when entering a social situation, Clark & Wells (1995) suggest 
that the attention is directed towards oneself creating behavioural and somatic symptoms, thus 
increasing self-awareness. Additionally, anticipatory processing prior to the social situation 
seems to play a greater role in socially anxious individuals than the social situation itself (e.g. 
Deiters et al., 2013; Nelson, Hodges, Hajcak & Shankman, 2015). Experimental tasks using 
speech anticipation have been used to demonstrate this aspect. Indeed, study 3 of this thesis 
focalises on this anticipation using electroencephalography and indicates a reduced sensory 
facilitation to threatening stimuli (Zanesco, under review). 
 
2.5.2. UNCERTAINTY AND AMBIGUITY IN SOCIAL ANXIETY 
Intolerance to uncertainty has been shown to be an important transdiagnostic variable in SAD 
(Oglesby, Raines, Short, Capron & Schmidt, 2016). Indeed, socially anxious individuals have 
a strong tendency to interpret ambiguous information as highly threatening compared to non-
anxious subjects (Constans, Penn, Ihen & Hope, 1999).  
Socially anxious subjects are not only characterised by attentional biases but also by 
interpretation biases as they perceive negatively the information from their environment 
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(Beard & Amir, 2008). For example, facial expressions of disgust are particularly threatening 
for individuals suffering from social anxiety (Rozin, Lowery & Ebert, 1994). Consequently, 
when socially anxious subjects are presented with ambiguous scenarios, they will fail to show 
a positive interpretation as observed in a non-socially anxious population (Constans et al., 
1999), resulting in increased anxiety and subsequent avoidance (Clark & Wells, 1995). 
Therefore, anxious individuals are likely to make false positive judgements when facing 
ambiguity. This phenomenon has been shown with facial expressions, with ambiguous social 
vignettes as well as with words in tasks such as the emotional Stroop. However, no study has 
explored this effect in the socially anxious population with ambiguous visual non-face stimuli. 
Among healthy subjects, it has been shown that ambiguous or multistable visual stimuli such 
as the Necker cube give rise to different and mutually exclusive perceptual interpretations (for 
a review see: Klink, van Wezel & van Ee, 2012) with enhanced P2 and N2 amplitudes (Gole, 
Schäfer & Schienle, 2012). In the first study of this thesis, we observed a greater P1 and N1 
amplitudes to ambiguous stimuli, suggesting enhanced sensory facilitation and selective 
attention to ambiguity compared to distinct stimuli.  Moreover, the second study of this thesis 
provides evidence for a decreased P3 amplitude when facing distinct stimuli, suggesting that 
certainty manifested by the accumulation of sensory evidence could be indexed by the P3 
component. However, no study has explored the perception of ambiguous non-face visual 
stimuli among the socially anxious population. This question was addressed in the last study 
of this thesis (Zanesco, under review) and corroborated the findings that ambiguity required 
higher selective attention compared to non-ambiguous stimuli, although the pattern was 
significantly diminished in socially anxious individuals compared to non-socially anxious 
individuals. An explanation based on the role of anticipation and excessive self-focusing 
manifested by a reduction in attention to external stimuli in socially anxious individuals has 
been put forward. 
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3. EXPERIMENTAL PART 
3.1. STUDY 1: SEEING IS BELIEVING: ERALY PERCEPTUAL BRAIN 
PROCESSES ARE MODIFIED BY SOCIAL FEEDBACK1 
 
Keywords: ERP, visual perception, P1, social feedback, uncertainty. 
 
   
Abstract 
Over 6 decades ago, experimental evidence from social psychology revealed that individuals 
could alter their responses in perceptual judgement tasks if they differed from the prevailing 
view emitted by a group of peers. Responses were thus modulated to agree with the opinion 
of the social group. An open question remains is whether such changes actually reflect 
modified perception, or whether they are simply the result of a feigned agreement, indicating 
submissive acceptance.  
In this study, we addressed this topic by performing a perceptual task involving the assessment 
of ambiguous and distinct stimuli. Participants were asked to judge the colours of squares, 
before, and after receiving feedback for their response. In order to pinpoint the moment in time 
that social feedback affected neural processing, ERP components to ambiguous stimuli were 
compared before and after participants received supposed social feedback that agreed with, or 
disputed their response. The comparison revealed the presence of differences beginning 
already 100ms after stimulus presentation (on the P1 and N1 components) despite otherwise 
identical stimuli. The modulation of these early components, normally thought to be dependent 
on low-level visual features, demonstrate that social pressure tangibly modifies early 
perceptual brain processes.  
 (1) Reprint of: Zanesco, J., Tipura, E., Posada, A., Clément, F., & Pegna, A. J. (2019). Seeing 
is believing: Early perceptual brain processes are modified by social feedback. Social 
neuroscience, 14(5), 519-529. 
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3.1.1. INTRODUCTION 
Almost 70 years ago, Solomon Asch (Asch, 1951), in a series of simple perceptual judgment 
experiments, observed that individuals would sometimes alter their responses to conform to 
the prevailing view emitted by their peers. Some 20 years later, Moscovici et al. (Moscovici, 
Lage & Naffrechoux, 1969), using a blue / green colour perception task, showed that even a 
minority expressing a consistent opinion, can lead participants to modify their responses in 
the long run. What is particularly significant in this latter study is the authors’ conclusion that 
response modification appears best accounted for as a change in perception than a simple 
verbal agreement. However, whether social influence has an actual effect on perceptual 
processes per se, or whether such changes in representation affect later, higher-level processes 
associated with perception in a top-down manner, remains to be clarified with the methods of 
neuroscience. 
One way by which neuroscientific research may inform us whether conformity acts on later, 
more elaborate cognitive levels, or whether it influences an individual’s actual perception, is 
by investigating the effect of group opinion on neural processing of visual stimuli. Few studies 
have examined the impact of conformity on early levels of perceptual and attentional processes 
as opposed to later, post-perceptual (e.g., executive) effects (Trautmann-Lengsfeld & 
Herrmann, 2013; Berns et al., 2005; Stapel and Koomen, 1997), despite the suggestion already 
raised by Asch (Asch, 1951) that social pressure could alter perception. The first investigation 
in this area was provided by Berns et al. (2005) using fMRI, who found evidence of alterations 
in perceptual processing (i.e., in occipito-parietal networks) when subjects were confronted 
with incorrect peer feedback regarding the degree of rotation of an abstract figure. However, 
the limited temporal resolution of hemodynamic measures does not allow their finding to be 
identified as an early or late process. Determining its temporal characteristics would prove 
highly revealing as this would indicate whether this activity arises rapidly, during the visual 
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processing phase, or long after higher-order, top-down processing has begun (Henson and 
Rugg, 2003). 
Electroencephalography (EEG) and event-related potentials (ERP) can extricate the temporal 
unfolding of this socially induced effect, and was consequently used by Trautmann-Lengsfeld 
& Herrmann (2013) to investigate whether social context affected early perceptual processes 
(see also: Herrmann & Knight, 2001) or not. In their study, participants were shown visual 
stimuli side by side and were asked to select one of the two on the basis of a perceptual 
criterion. Simultaneously, an indication was provided alongside the stimuli, informing the 
participants of the response given by the supposed social group. The findings revealed that the 
P1 (a positive deflection occurring over posterior electrodes at around 100ms in response to a 
visual stimulation) was smaller in amplitude when participants’ response conformed with the 
group’s incorrect response. This very interesting study therefore concluded that social 
influence acts on early levels of visual processing. However, the authors did not find any 
significant difference in P1 amplitude when participants adapted to the group’s incorrect 
judgment compared to the condition where they refused to do so, thus mitigating the 
conclusions. Furthermore, the presentation of lateralised stimuli necessitated left vs. right-
sided comparisons, which necessarily produces modulations of early ERP components 
sensitive to the direction of spatial attention (Luck et al., 1990). Additionally, the simultaneous 
presentation of competing stimuli and the group’s decision does not allow, strictly speaking, 
the study of revised judgments by participants, which could be better investigated using 
sequential stimulus presentations with indications of social feedback presented in between. 
The purpose of the present study was thus to address the question of whether social influence 
impacts on early perceptual processes in situations of uncertainty induced by ambiguous 
stimuli. For this, we recorded EEG while examining the effects of social feedback while 
participants performed a visual discrimination task. We manipulated stimulus ambiguity, as 
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previous studies have robustly demonstrated that social influence is most effective in 
situations of ambiguity and uncertainty (Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004). Inspired by a couple 
of studies that investigated the role of consensus in metacognition (Eskenazi, Montalan, 
Jacquot, Proust, Grèzes, and Conty, 2016; McCurdy, Maniscalco, Metcalfe, Liu, de Lange, 
and Lau, 2013), a novel experimental paradigm was created allowing us to measure event-
related potentials (ERPs) in response to visual stimuli that were presented before and after 
social feedback, the latter being given by a face that either endorsed (i.e., displayed a happy 
face) or disputed (i.e., displayed a disgusted expression) the participant’s judgment. 
Participants were asked to judge the colour of a square (the probe) that was either of a distinct 
blue or green colour (termed “distinct probe”), or was of a highly ambiguous bluish-green hue 
(“ambiguous probe”). They were also asked to indicate the level of confidence of their 
judgment. Participants then received social feedback and the probe was presented once again 
for re-evaluation and judgment.  
We hypothesised that participants would adapt their response to the opinion of the purported 
group when the stimulus was ambiguous and the social group disputed the participant’s 
response. We focused on the visual P1 and N1 components locked to the presentation of the 
probe stimuli (coloured squares), before and after social feedback. These components are 
considered to be the earliest electrical marker of visual processing, and are influenced both by 
the low-level features of the stimuli (Johannes, Münte, Heinze and Mangun, 1995), and by 
attentional processes (Luck et al., 1990). However, as low-level features were strictly 
controlled and no variations were operated on attention, any differences would only be 
attributable to an influence of social pressure. We predicted that if social influence acted 
directly on perceptual processes, changes should be observed on these early components, 
while changes on an explicit level would more likely be reflected on later components.   
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3.1.2. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
3.1.2.1. PARTICIPANTS 
Twenty-two students were recruited using posters placed at the University of Geneva (13 
females, 9 males; mean age = 25.14, SD= 3.61). All the participants were right-handed (mean 
laterality coefficient = 71.96, SD = 20.97 (Oldfield, 1971)), had normal or a corrected-to-
normal vision and had no self-reported psychiatric or neurological disorder. The participants 
all reported that they were heterosexual and were not colour blind. They were paid 50 Swiss 
francs for their participation.  
3.1.2.2. STIMULI AND EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE 
Participants were presented with stimuli that displayed either an unequivocal, distinct colour 
(blue or green), or an ambiguous one (greenish-blue). They were asked to respond by 
indicating the colour that they thought was presented. Subsequently, they were given alleged 
social feedback, which they were told was the response of the majority of a sample population 
of women and men, tested beforehand. They were told that a happy face would indicate that 
their response was consistent with the majority, while a face expressing disgust would indicate 
that their response was in disagreement with the majority of other participants. They were then 
shown the identical probe once again and were asked for a second judgment, either revising 
their initial response, or maintaining their decision.    
The stimuli consisted of 32 coloured squares (probes) displaying different shades of blue and 
green, displayed on a white background. Eight distinct colours were clearly and unmistakably 
identifiable as green (hereafter distinct green), and 8 others as blue (hereafter distinct blue). 
The 16 remaining stimuli were made up of colours that were highly equivocal. These 
ambiguous probes were produced by changing the ratio of green, blue and red while 
maintaining overall luminance (minimum saturation: 28.17 cd/m2; maximum saturation: 30.73 
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cd/m2). As a result, for these 16 ambiguous, greenish-blue probes, 8 displayed a slightly 
greener hue (ambiguous green) and 8 a slightly bluer hue (ambiguous blue).  
The faces used for social feedback in this experiment were 10 male and 10 female identities 
expressing happiness and disgust, taken from the Radboud Faces Database (Langner, Dotsch, 
Bijlstra, Wigboldus, Hawk, and van Knippenberg, 2010). All the stimuli measured 10 cm 
horizontally and 10 cm vertically and subtended a visual angle of 5.73° when seen from the 
participants’ viewing distance of 100 cm.  
Participants were given instructions regarding the task and gave their informed consent to 
participate in the study prior to electrode placement. The experiment began with a practice 
session. Once the task was fully understood, the experiment proper began.  
The experiment was divided in three blocks of 160 trials, for a total of 480 trials. Each trial 
was composed of an initial evaluation of the probe, a social cue providing feedback, and a 
second (post-cue) presentation of the same probe for re-evaluation. Figure 1 illustrates the 
sequence of each trial in detail. These began with a fixation cross, presented for a random 
duration between 400 and 600ms. A coloured square was then presented for 800 ms and was 
followed again by a fixation cross (between 400 and 600 ms). The letters V (which stands for 
“vert”, or green in French) and B (blue) were then presented on the left and right of the fixation 
cross and participants were instructed to indicate the perceived colour of the stimulus as 
quickly as possible by means of a key press. If no response was given, the display disappeared 
after 3000ms. The response options were indicated by two stickers placed on the computer 
mouse, representing letters V and B that participants pressed with their right forefinger and 
middle finger. Correspondence between response finger and colour was counterbalanced 
across subjects. After the response, a fixation cross appeared for 400-600ms, this was followed 
by the self-confidence evaluation represented by a scale ranging from 1 (uncertain) to 5 
(certain). The fixation cross then reappeared for 400-600ms, followed by the social feedback 
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cue for 1000 ms, represented as a face (male or female, 50% each), displaying an expression 
either of happiness or of disgust. The participants were told that when the face expressed a 
happy emotion, their response corresponded to that given by the majority of former 
participants, whereas an expression of disgust indicated that their response differed from the 
majority. In actual fact, the expression was assigned randomly for each trial. In order to 
maximise credibility, probes composed of distinct colours (easily identifiable by participants) 
were always followed by a social cue indicating endorsement (i.e., a happy face).  
After feedback, a fixation cross re-appeared for 400-600ms, followed by the same probe again 
for 800ms. A second judgement was then required, followed by a self-confidence rating, in 
the same manner as the first (see Figure 15). A blank screen (2000ms) appeared at the end of 
this sequence, marking the end the trial. A total of 160 trials were presented in each of the 
three conditions (ambiguous endorsed, ambiguous disputed, distinct endorsed). 
  
43 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Example of an experimental trial. A distinct blue (top) and distinct green square (bottom) 
is illustrated, but only one probe was presented in each given trial. Here, the social cue is a happy 
face, thus indicating endorsement.  
After the EEG experiment, participants were asked to evaluate the credibility of the social cue 
by indicating their level of belief on a 3-point scale (1: never believed in it; 2: believed in it 
sometimes; 3: always believed in it). 
The study was accepted by the local ethics committee (University of Geneva) and was 
performed in agreement with the Declaration of Helsinki. 
3.1.2.3. EEG ACQUISITION 
EEG was recorded using a 128-channels Biosemi Active-Two system (Amsterdam, 
Netherlands) with AG/AgCl electrodes positioned according to the extended 10-20 system. 
We used four additional flat electrodes, which were placed on the outer canthi of the eyes and 
above and under the right eye, in order to capture the eye movements and blinks. Each active 
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electrode is represented with an impedance value, which we tried to keep below 20 kΩ for 
each participant. The EEG was continuously recorded with a sampling rate of 1024 Hz. Data 
was re-referenced off-line against the average reference. 
3.1.2.4. EEG PROCESSING 
Standard processing of EEG data was done offline using the software Brain Vision Analyzer 
V.2 (Brain Products, Gilching, Germany). The data was downsampled to 512 Hz. For the 
coloured square stimuli, epochs were computed from 200 ms prior to 800 ms after stimulus 
onset. Bad electrodes were removed and interpolated using a spherical spline (5.6% of the 
electrodes were interpolated in this way). A baseline correction was applied using the 200 ms 
prestimulus period. ERPs were obtained by averaging the trials for each condition, on the data 
that was filtered with a low-cutoff at 0.1 Hz and a high-cutoff at 30 Hz. Ocular correction was 
performed on the EEG using the implemented standard algorithm (Gratton, Coles & Donchin, 
1983), in order to correct for eye movements and blinks. Trials with other artefacts were 
removed using a semi-automatic procedure following each stimulus presentation (amplitude 
allowed: -100μV to +100 μV). Accordingly, the mean number of segments retained per 
condition was 130 ± 22 trials (out of 160) for the ambiguous endorsed condition, 130 ± 22 
trials (out of 160) for the ambiguous disputed condition and 127 ± 24 trials (out of 160) for 
the distinct endorsed condition. A total of 19% of the trials were removed. 
3.1.2.5. BEHAVIOURAL ANALYSIS 
Trials in which participants revised their judgement after social feedback were counted as 
“revisions”. The mean number of revisions was calculated according to the ambiguity of the 
probe and the emotion of the social cue.  
Statistical analyses of behavioural results were performed using repeated-measures ANOVAs. 
To examine the effect of the social cue on perceptual judgement, we carried out an ANOVA 
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for repeated-measures, using the number of revisions as the dependent variable and 
“condition” (ambiguous endorsed vs ambiguous disputed vs distinct endorsed) as the within-
subject factors.  
3.1.2.6. ELECTROPHYSIOLOGICAL RECORDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
ERPs were computed for the distinct and ambiguous probes in the initial and post-cue 
presentations. Additional analyses were performed on the ERPs of the happy (endorsement) 
and disgusted faces (dispute) and are reported in the Supplemental material.  
Early stages of processing were investigated by examining the P1 and N1 components in the 
different conditions, i.e., following the onset of the initial probe and following the onset of the 
post-cue probe. Peaks were determined using a semi-automatic peak detection method. The 
time windows of investigation were determined on the basis of the peaks observed in the grand 
averages across all conditions using a collapsed localizer (Luck, 2014). In this manner, P1 was 
measured over electrodes A14, A15, A16, A27, A28, A29 in the time window from 70ms to 
180ms, and N1 was obtained from electrodes A9, A10, A11, B6, B7, and B8 in the time 
window from 160ms to 240ms (see Figure 16 for electrode positions).  
The EEG data were analysed using separate repeated-measures ANOVAs that aimed to 
identify the effect of social feedback on the early P1 and N1 components of the probes. For 
this, 2 (presentation: initial vs. post-cue) X 2 (laterality: left vs. right) repeated-measures 
ANOVAs were performed on the mean latencies and amplitudes obtained over the electrodes 
within the regions of interest. In order to maintain credibility, our design deliberately excluded 
the condition in which distinct colours were “disputed” by the social group. Consequently, 3 
conditions were presented: distinct stimuli that were endorsed by the alleged social group, 
ambiguous stimuli that were endorsed and ambiguous stimuli that were disputed. Separate 
ANOVAs were performed for each of the 3 conditions.  
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An effect of social cue was expected for the ambiguous disputed condition.  
For clarity, only relevant comparisons are reported in the Results. 
 
Figure 16. Electrodes retained for analysis. All channels are represented as open circles situated on a 
view of the scalp seen from above (nose on top, left side on the left. Electrodes used for analysis are 
indicated with full black circles. (a) the P1 component included electrodes A14, A15, A16 over the left 
and A27, A28, A29 over the right occipital regions (b) the N1 component included electrodes A9, A10, 
A11 on the left and B6, B7, B8 on the right.  
 
3.1.3. RESULTS 
Among the twenty-two subjects, one participant was excluded due to high number of artefacts. 
The following analyses (behavioural and EEG) were carried out on twenty-one subjects (nine 
men and twelve women). 
3.1.3.1. BEHAVIOURAL RESULTS 
An ANOVA was performed on the number of revisions, using condition (ambiguous 
endorsed, ambiguous disputed and distinct endorsed) as a within-subject factor, which 
revealed a significant main effect of condition F(2, 40)=20.6, p < .00001. Post-hoc 
comparisons carried out using Tukey tests revealed a significantly greater number of revisions 
for ambiguous disputed (26.3%) compared to ambiguous endorsed (4.7%) and distinct 
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endorsed probes (1.4%) (p < 10-4 for ambiguous disputed vs ambiguous endorsed; p <. 10-5 
for ambiguous disputed vs distinct endorsed). The number of revisions did not differ 
significantly between ambiguous endorsed and distinct endorsed conditions (p > .05) (Fig. 
17).     
Results of the self-report questionnaire revealed that 70% of the participants always believed 
in the social cue, while 19% stated that they believed in it occasionally and 11% reported that 
they did not. Importantly, participants who reported not to have believed the social cue, still 
produced changes after their initial response to match the social feedback. Subjects reporting 
disbelief in the social feedback revised on average of 6% of their judgments, compared to 9% 
for those who claimed an occasional belief and 12% for those who reported a full belief in the 
social feedback. 
In summary, the behavioural results showed that the majority of participants considered the 
social feedback to be credible, and when challenged in their judgement regarding ambiguous 
probes, generated a significantly greater number of revisions than when these probes were 
endorsed.  
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Figure 17. Behavioural results. Percentage of revisions (i.e., reversal of perceptual judgements) made 
by participants in the three experimental conditions (ambiguous stimuli that were subsequently 
endorsed, ambiguous stimuli that were subsequently disputed, and distinct stimuli that were 
subsequently endorsed). 
 
3.1.3.2. ELECTROPHYSIOLOGICAL RESULTS 
ERPs 
P1 amplitude: A 2 (presentation: initial vs. post-cue) X 2 (laterality: left vs. right) ANOVA 
performed on the P1 amplitudes for the ambiguous disputed condition showed a main effect 
of presentation (F(1, 20)=6.71, p=.018) arising from the fact that the P1 was greater for the 
post-cue presentations of the ambiguous probes (6.84 ± 2.56μV) compared to the initial 
presentation (6.34 ± 2.55μV) (Fig. 20). No such effect was not found in the ANOVA for the 
distinct endorsed probes (F(1, 20)= 0.01, p=.92) (Fig. 18). The same ANOVA performed on 
the P1 amplitudes of the ambiguous endorsed probes showed a significant interaction between 
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presentation and laterality (F(1, 20)=7.42, p=.0.013), due to a difference in amplitude over the 
right hemisphere leads between initial and post-cue presentations (Fig.19). 
P1 latency:  The 2 (presentation) X 2 (laterality) ANOVAs performed for each of the 3 
conditions showed significant main effects of presentation. In the 3 ANOVAs, P1 was found 
to peak significantly later than for post-cue stimuli compared to the initial presentation.  Table 
1 shows the effects on the P1 mean latencies for each of the three conditions and Table 2 
summarises the results of the 3 ANOVAs. 
 
Table 1. F and p values for the statistical comparison of the P1 (top row) and N170 (bottom row) 
amplitudes (left column) and latencies (right column) in response to the colour stimuli before and after 
presentation of social feedback. The results are shown for each of the 3 experimental conditions 
(ambiguous endorsed, ambiguous disputed and distinct endorsed).  
 
N1 amplitude: The 2 (presentation) X 2 (laterality) ANOVAs performed on the N1 
amplitudes in each of the 3 conditions revealed a significant main effect of presentation 
(ambiguous endorsed: F(1, 20)=20.36, p=.0002; ambiguous disputed: F(1, 20)=31.77, 
p=.00002, and distinct endorsed: F(1, 20)=48.14, p<.00001) (Fig.18, 19, 20). The mean N1 
amplitudes for probes presented after the social cue (see Table 2 for values) were significantly 
less negative than upon initial presentation (ambiguous = -2.32 μV, distinct = -2.65 μV).  
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Table 2. F and p values for the statistical comparison of the P1 (top row) and N1 (bottom row) 
amplitudes (left column) and latencies (right column) in response to the colour stimuli before and after 
presentation of social feedback. The results are shown for each of the 3 experimental conditions 
(ambiguous endorsed, ambiguous disputed and distinct endorsed).  
N1 latency: No significant effects of latency were observed for the N1 latencies (Table 2). 
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Figure 18. ERPs for distinct probes presented before (black trace) and after (red trace) social 
endorsement (i.e., presentation of a happy face). Traces are shown for two occipital electrodes (one 
left and one right) used to compute P1 (a, b) and N1 (d, e). (c) Topographical voltage map illustrating 
the P1 (time period between 70-180ms indicated with a black bracket in a and b). (f) Topographical 
voltage map illustrating N1 (time period between 160-240ms indicated with a black bracket in d and 
e). 
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Figure 19. ERPs for ambiguous probes presented before (black trace) and after (red trace) social 
endorsement (i.e., presentation of a happy face).  Traces are shown for two occipital electrodes (one 
left and one right) used to compute P1 (a, b) and N1 (d, e). (c) Topographical voltage map illustrating 
the P1 (time period between 70-180ms indicated with a black bracket in a and b). (f) Topographical 
voltage map illustrating N1 (time period between 160-240ms indicated with a black bracket in d and 
e). 
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Figure 20. ERPs for ambiguous probes presented before (black trace) and after (red trace) social 
disagreement (i.e., presentation of a disgusted face).  Traces are shown for two occipital electrodes 
(one left and one right) used to compute P1 (a, b) and N1 (d, e). (c) Topographical voltage map 
illustrating the P1 (time period between 70-180ms indicated with a black bracket in a and b). (f) 
Topographical voltage map illustrating N1 (time period between 160-240ms indicated with a black 
bracket in d and e). 
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3.1.4. DISCUSSION 
The aim of the present study was to explore the effect of social feedback on perceptual 
processes, and in particular to determine the temporal period on which such feedback impacts. 
This was produced by asking participants to categorise distinct or ambiguous colour stimuli 
before and after alleged social feedback that confirmed or disputed the participants’ responses.  
As expected, when faced with ambiguous stimuli, participants revised their judgments more 
often following social disagreement than following endorsement of their judgments (a 
negligible amount of revisions were made after endorsement of distinct hues). Confirming the 
validity of the feedback provided, when questioned after the procedure, the majority of the 
participants claimed to have believed the authenticity of the feedback.  
ERPs measured in response to the ambiguous and distinct colour probes before and after social 
feedback revealed a number of differences arising very early on (within the first 120ms) as 
well as later in time (beyond 190ms), suggesting that social cues modulate brain activity 
during early stages of processing. Interestingly, the ERPs in response to the faces providing 
social feedback showed modulations that differed according to the ambiguity of the probes, 
further strengthening the idea that the cues were actively taken into account during the 
perceptual judgment task (see supplementary material).  
Most importantly, an increase in P1 amplitude was found after the participants’ judgements of 
ambiguous stimuli were disputed by the social group, while ambiguous probes that were 
endorsed only enhanced activity over the right electrodes in this period. Moreover, no effect 
was seen on distinct stimuli. 
These findings suggest that social information modulates early perceptual processes. Indeed, 
the differences observed in the early electrophysiological response between the initial and 
post-cue presentations occurred even though the stimuli were identical. This indicates that 
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feedback cues are able to act directly on the early visual ERPs, impinging on early processes 
that arise in the visual extrastriate regions (Di Russo, Martinez, Sereno, Pitzalis & Hillyard, 
2002). Since this effect cannot be driven by bottom-up by low-level features (as the stimuli 
are identical), it necessarily arises through top-down activation. One likely mechanism for this 
could be that top-down processes affects neural gain in the visual system by heightening its 
sensory capability. This mechanism in fact explains the enhancements observed in early ERP 
components that arise when spatial attention is directed towards specific locations. Indeed, 
larger P1 amplitudes have been observed for stimuli presented at attended locations, reflecting 
a facilitation of early sensory processing (Luck et al., 1990).  
Consequently, one may contend that the early modulations in our study derive essentially from 
a similar heightened sensory processing which could be due to a differential engagement of 
attentional processes for the ambiguous, challenged stimulus.  
Alternatively, this effect could be the consequence of a greater mobilisation of attention linked 
to the increased relevance of the stimulus. Indeed, P1 modulations have been observed in 
response to highly relevant stimuli such as photographs of spiders, or to anticipatory spider-
containing material in arachnophobics (Michalowski, Melzig, Weike, Stockburger, Schupp & 
Hamm, 2009; Michalowski, Pané-Farré, Löw, & Hamm, 2015). Moreover, enhanced P1 
responses have been found for threatening cues more generally (Bublatzky, Flaisch, 
Stockburger, Schmälzle, & Schupp, 2010; Bublatzky & Schupp, 2012), and heightened N1 
responses have been noted under conditions of anticipation of socially relevant feedback 
(Schindler, Wegrzyn, Steppacher, & Kissler, 2014).  
Notwithstanding the underlying mechanism, the fact remains that an early effect was 
observed, which was caused by manipulation of alleged social information. It is therefore 
question whether early attentional processes are sensitive, and can be influenced by, higher-
order social processes. This question was addressed in a study by Wykowska and colleagues 
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(Wykowska, Wiese, Prosser & Müller, 2014). The authors showed that the P1 was enhanced 
for stimuli appearing at a validly cued location when participants believed that the cue was 
provided by a human being rather than a machine. In our paradigm, the increased P1 for 
ambiguous stimuli appearing after, compared to before the social cue therefore appear to 
reflect the effect of social information exerting a top-down influence on early visuospatial 
processes. 
The current findings corroborate the only existing study to our knowledge, (Trautmann-
Lengsfeld & Herrmann, 2013), to have investigated ERPs with a similar hypothesis in mind. 
However, two major differences exist between the latter investigation and the present study. 
First, our study included distinct colour probes, which served as a control condition in order 
to examine the impact of uncertainty under social pressure, whereas in the investigation by 
Trautmann-Lengsfeld & Herrmann, ambiguity was a constant. Even more importantly, our 
inclusion of sequential processing which contained both positive and negative feedback for 
ambiguous probes allowed for direct comparisons of the same stimulus before and after the 
social cue, thus consolidating the visibility of the cue’s effect.   
A difference also arose for ambiguous probes after social feedback at the N1 level. This overall 
amplitude enhancement for post-cue presentations of ambiguous probes was in fact also 
observed for distinct probes. This general enhancement of the post-cue N1 component for all 
stimuli could be seen either as effect of stimulus repetition, or as a global effect of social 
feedback that would be independent of its value (agreement or disagreement) and of the 
participant’s perceptual certainty (apparently ambiguous or distinct stimuli). Previous reports 
have evidenced changes in N1 for repeated presentations of visual stimuli (Olofsson & Polich, 
2007; Groh-Bordin, Busch, Herrmann, & Zimmer, 2007), however these have been described 
as decreases in amplitude occurring with repetition and thus occur in the opposite direction to 
our findings. Non-specific effects of repetition therefore seem unlikely. The alternate 
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possibility may therefore be that the N1 enhancement is associated with heightened attention 
towards the probes (Luck et al., 1990), and an increase in discriminative processes at the 
attended location (Hillyard, Vogel & Luck, 1998; Luck & Hillyard, 1995). It is plausible that 
social feedback, independently of probe ambiguity, led to greater attention at the location of 
the stimulus (Mangun & Hillyard, 1991; Johannes et al., 1995; Hillyard & Annlo-Vento, 1998; 
Hopfinger & West, 2006) possibly in relation to some aspect of stimulus categorisation 
(Oliver, Cristino, Roberts, Pegna & Leek, 2017; Pegna, Darque, Roberts & Leek, 2017). 
Nevertheless, the presence of the enhanced N1 in all our experimental conditions do not allow 
us to conclude unequivocally to an effect of social feedback.  
3.1.5. CONCLUSION 
Taken together, our electrophysiological results support the hypothesis that social feedback 
can modulate early visual perception in situations of perceptual uncertainty, by acting on the 
early steps of visual processing that take place around 100ms after stimulus presentation. 
These effects are modulated according to whether social feedback endorses or disputes the 
participants’ responses. Future studies will be necessary to ascertain the significance of the 
later ERP modulations that may well be linked to more complex functions such as stimulus 
monitoring. 
3.1.6. SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL 
The early processing of the “social cue” per se was investigated by examining the two earliest 
components evoked by the face, namely the P1 and N170. Here, we hypothesised that if social 
feedback was effective in influencing behaviour, the processing of agreement faces should 
differ according to whether they appeared after ambiguous probes than obvious ones.  
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ERPs were computed separately for happy faces (indicating endorsement) and disgusted faces 
(indicating disagreement/dispute), and were further examined separately when they followed 
a distinct or an ambiguous probe. 
Electrophysiological recordings and analysis 
As with the P1 and N1 for the probes, the P1 and N170 time-locked to the faces (social cues) 
were identified on the basis of the grand average across all conditions. In this manner, the time 
window for the P1 was observed between 70ms and 180ms, and that of the N170 between 
120ms and 200ms after face presentation. The maximum positivity (for the P1) and negativity 
(for the N170) were observed on the occipito-temporal electrodes, which included electrodes 
D31, A10, A15 on the left and A28, B7, B11 on the right (see Fig. S1). 
 
Fig. S1. Electrodes retained for analysis. All channels are represented as open circles situated on a 
view of the scalp seen from above (nose on top, left side on the left. Electrodes used for analysis of the 
N170 component are indicated with full black circles. The N170 component included electrodes A15, 
A10, D31 over the left and A28, B7, B11 over the right occipito-temporal regions.  
 
The P1 and N170 values were then obtained for all participants in response to the facial cue 
when it indicated social endorsement (happy expression) or when it indicated disagreement 
(disgusted expression) after a perceptual judgment performed on ambiguous colours. In 
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addition, happy faces were compared after presentation of distinct colours and ambiguous 
colours (again, no comparison could be made for disgusted faces after distinct and ambiguous 
colours, as for the sake of credibility, distinct colours were never followed by disagreement).   
After the EEG experiment, participants were asked to evaluate the 20 faces presented during 
the task (neutral expression) according to three dimensions: attractiveness, intelligence and 
trust, on a scale ranging from 0 to 5.  
Electrophysiological results 
ERPs responses to social cue 
Given that the P1 and the N170 responses to the social cue could be affected by the ambiguity 
of the preceding stimulus, we ran two separate repeated measures ANOVAs for each 
component. The first ANOVA was a 2 (ambiguity: ambiguous or distinct probe preceding the 
face) X 2 (laterality: left vs right) analysis aimed at comparing if the (happy) faces were 
processed differently depending on whether they followed an ambiguous probe or a distinct 
probe. The second ANOVA was a 2 (social cue: endorse vs. dispute) X 2 (laterality: left vs. 
right) analysis comparing the ERP response to endorsement vs. dispute (i.e. happy vs. 
disgusted faces) following ambiguous probes. The results are summarized in Table S1. 
P1 amplitude: Neither ambiguity (F(1, 20)=.61, p=.45), nor social cue (F(1, 20)=.45, p=.51) 
affected P1 amplitude.  
P1 latency: The peak P1 latency to happy faces varied significantly according to the 
ambiguity of the preceding stimuli (F(1, 20)=6.02, p=.023), with an earlier response to happy 
faces when they followed ambiguous probes (116.4 ± 27.22 ms) compared to distinct ones 
(124.07 ± 31.76 ms) (Fig. S2). 
N170 amplitude: The N170 amplitudes for happy faces were affected by the ambiguity of the 
preceding stimuli (F(1, 20)=24.36, p=.00008). The N170 response was significantly enhanced 
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for happy faces that followed an ambiguous probe (-3.85 ± 4.63 μV) than for those that 
followed a distinct probe (-2.16 ± 4.34μV) (Fig. S2). No amplitude effect was found for the 
comparison between happy and disgusted faces following ambiguous probes. 
N170 latency: The N170 latency, varied significantly between happy and disgusted 
expressions that were preceded by ambiguous stimuli (F(1, 20)=9.202, p=.007): the N170 to 
happy faces were significantly earlier (151.44 ± 14.75 ms) than those evoked by disgusted 
faces (153.74 ± 17.43 ms) (Fig. S3). No latency effect was found to the social cue in agreement 
(happy faces) following ambiguous compared to distinct probes. 
Table S1 shows the results from the repeated measures ANOVAs for the P1 and N170 
components in response to the social cue and as a function of ambiguity of the preceding 
stimulus and expression of the social cue. 
 
Supplementary Table 1. F and p values for the statistical comparison of the P1 (top row) and N170 
(bottom row) amplitudes (left column) and latencies (right column) in response to the social cue. The 
results are shown for each of the 2 experimental conditions: 1) endorsing cue following distinct vs 
ambiguous, and 2) endorsing vs disputed cue following ambiguous probes.  
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Fig. S2.  ERPs for the social cue presentation: ERPs for happy faces presented immediately after 
ambiguous and distinct stimuli shown over left (a) and right (b) occipito-temporal electrodes. (c) 
Topographical voltage maps illustrating the P1 (time period between 70-180ms indicated with a black 
bracket in a and b). (d) Topographical voltage map illustrating N170 (time period between 120-200ms 
indicated with a black bracket in a and b). 
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Fig. S3. ERPs for an endorsing social cue (happy face) compared to a disputed social cue (disgusted 
face) following ambiguous probes illustrating the N170 over left (a) and right (b) temporal electrodes. 
(c) Topographical voltage map of the N170 (120-200ms) for the happy and disgusted faces, following 
ambiguous probes. 
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3.2.  STUDY 2: PATTERNS OF ELECTRICAL BRAIN ACTIVATION IN 
RESPONSE TO SOCIALLY-DISPUTED PERCEPTUAL JUDGMENTS2 
Keywords: Uncertainty, social conflict, social feedback, emotional expressions, perception, 
ambiguity, EEG-ERP, P2, P3, LPP 
 
 
  
Abstract 
In recent years, neuroscience has begun to investigate brain responses to social stimuli. To 
date however, the effects of social feedback on attentional and perceptual processes remain 
unclear. In this study, participants were asked to judge the hues of distinct, or ambiguously 
coloured stimuli, and to indicate their confidence ratings. Alleged social feedback was then 
provided, either endorsing or disputing the participants’ responses. Participants were then 
presented the stimulus a second time and given the option to reconsider their decision. 
Behavioural findings showed that confidence levels decreased both with task difficulty and 
with conflicting social feedback. ERP data showed greater P2 and N2 amplitudes for 
ambiguous squares compared to distinct squares upon initial stimulus presentations, 
compatible with heightened attention. Moreover, a decreased P300 was found for ambiguous 
stimuli, consistent with an increase in metacognitive activity. After social feedback, an early 
LPP between 270ms and 370ms continued to distinguish ambiguous from distinct stimuli. 
More importantly, after 400ms, the LPP distinguished endorsed from disputed stimuli. These 
results reveal that social feedback, while decreasing effects linked to uncertainty, gives rise to 
later processes associated with enhanced motivational significance of the stimulus following 
divergence from social approval.  
 (2) Reprint of : Zanesco, J., Tipura, E., Clément, F., & Pegna, A. J. (2019). Patterns of electrical 
brain activation in response to socially-disputed perceptual judgements. NeuroReport, 30 (17), 
1205-1209.  
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3.2.1. INTRODUCTION 
In everyday life, decisions are often made even though detailed information may be lacking. 
These decisions are continuously being updated by additional evidence fed back by the 
environment. One component contributing to decision processes that has been underestimated 
by cognitive neuroscience is the social information provided by individuals in our 
surroundings. Indeed, an individual’s certainty is not only determined by the degree of 
ambiguity of the sensory information originating from the stimulus (Selimbeyoglu et al., 2012; 
Yeung & Summerfield, 2012), but is also influenced by social cues (Eskenazi et al., 2016), 
which in turn affect perceptual brain processes (Zanesco et al., 2018). This latter point was 
suggested by Zanesco et al. (2018) who showed that social feedback modified the early event-
related (ERP) components in response to ambiguous stimuli already at around 100ms. Such 
observations raise the question of whether later cognitive processes, indicating more 
controlled aspects of self-reflection, are influenced by social feedback. Indeed, conflicting and 
ambiguous information give rise to a subjective feeling of uncertainty (Smithson, 2015), 
which in turn leads to additional allocation of attentional resources (Dieterich, Endrass & 
Kathmann, 2016) and conscious control (Shimamura, 2000).  
To address this question, an ERP investigation was carried out using a novel procedure (see 
Zanesco et al., 2018 for details), in which distinct or ambiguous colour stimuli were presented 
to participants, who were asked to judge their colour and then rate the degree of certainty in 
their judgment. They were then provided with alleged social feedback that either endorsed or 
disputed the participants’ response. The same stimuli were then shown again and participants 
were given the option to maintain or revise their decision/ certainty. ERPs were examined for 
ambiguous and distinct stimuli (initial presentations), and more importantly for endorsed and 
disputed ambiguous stimuli (post-feedback presentations). We reasoned that, compared to the 
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initial stimulus presentation, ERPs for stimuli following social feedback would reveal the 
effects of social information on cognitive processing.  
3.2.2. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
3.2.2.1. PARTICPANTS 
Twenty paid participants (10 females; mean age = 25  4) were recruited for this study (3 
participants were excluded due >30% errors). All were right-handed, had normal or corrected 
to-normal vision and had no self-reported psychiatric or neurological disorder.  
3.2.2.2. STIMULI AND EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE 
A fixation cross was presented (400 - 600ms) followed by the probe stimulus (800ms) that 
was a square stimulus (5.73°) that was either of a distinct blue or green colour (16 stimuli), or 
of an ambiguous green/blue hue (16 stimuli controlled for isoluminance, ranging from 
28.17cd/m2 - 30.72 cd/m2). After the stimulus, a response prompt (self-paced) appeared 
asking the participant to decide whether the stimulus was green or blue. Participants were then 
asked to rate their level of certainty on a scale from 1 to 5. 
They were then presented with a face (1000ms) which they were told reflected the judgement 
of the majority of previous participants, and which expressed either disgust (disagreement) or 
joy (endorsement) (Langner et al., 2010). The stimulus sequence was then repeated, in the 
same order and participants were required to maintain or to revise their decision.  
3.2.2.3. EEG ACQUISITION 
A 128-channel recording was carried out with a sampling rate of 1024Hz using a Biosemi 
Active-Two system (Amsterdam, Netherlands) with AG/AgCl electrodes (electrode positions 
are shown in figs 1 and 2). Eye movements were monitored using 4 additional electrodes. 
Impedance was kept below 20 kΩ and data was referenced offline against the average 
reference. 
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3.2.2.4. EEG PROCESSING 
Using Brain Vision Analyzer V.2 (Brain Products, Gilching, Germany), EEG data was 
downsampled to 512Hz and filtered between 0.1Hz and 30Hz. Bad electrodes were 
interpolated using a spherical spline (6.6% of the electrodes were interpolated). Eye 
movements and blinks were corrected (Gratton et al., 1983) and trials containing artefacts 
were removed (22%).  ERPs were computed for distinct and ambiguous stimuli in the initial 
presentation between -200ms to 800ms using the 200ms prestimulus period for baseline 
correction. For the post-feedback stimulus presentations ERPs were computed for ambiguous 
endorsed, ambiguous disputed and distinct endorsed conditions. In order to maintain 
credibility, our design did not include any social dispute for distinct probes. Following visual 
inspection, the P2, N2 and P3 amplitudes were retained for statistical investigation of the 
initial presentation. For the post-feedback presentation, no P3 was observed, by contrast, a late 
positive potential (LPP) was found to distinguish the experimental conditions. Consequently, 
the P2, N2 and LPP were analysed for the post-feedback stimulus presentation. When 
necessary, adjusted p-values were used to control for sphericity. 
Initial stimulus presentations 
Visual inspection showed differences on the P2, N2 and P3 components.  The time windows 
for analysis were subsequently determined on the basis of the peaks and means observed in 
the grand averages across all conditions using a collapsed localizer. The P2 peaks (210ms - 
260ms) were determined using a semi-automatic peak detection method and were measured 
over two groups of electrodes on the left and right scalp (Fig. 21). Mean amplitudes were 
measured for the N2 (220ms - 270ms) over the left, midline and right frontal electrodes (fig. 
1). P3 mean amplitudes (350ms - 450ms) were measured over occipito-parietal electrodes on 
the right, midline and left scalp (Fig. 21).  
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Post-feedback stimulus presentations 
The same electrodes and time windows were used to compute the P2 and N2 components for 
the post-feedback stimulus presentations. Mean amplitudes for the LPP component were 
computed over a group of 3 occipito-temporal electrodes (Fig. 22) in two separate time 
windows (270ms - 370ms and 400ms - 500ms). 
3.2.3. RESULTS 
3.2.3.1. BEHAVIOURAL RESULTS 
Initial presentations: Certainty ratings for distinct stimuli were at 98.55% and at 69.87% for 
ambiguous stimuli.  
Post-feedback presentations: For distinct (endorsed) stimuli, certainty ratings were at 99.22% 
while for ambiguous stimuli these were at 75.81% for endorsed and 67.07% for disputed 
stimuli.  
ANOVA for repeated-measures was carried out on the confidence ratings of the endorsed 
stimuli using position (initial/second presentation) and condition (ambiguous/distinct) as 
factors. The main effects of position (F(1, 16) = 21.26, p < 10-4) and condition (F(1, 16) = 
75.3, p < 10-6) were significant, as well as the interaction between position and condition (F(1, 
16) = 13.3, p < 10-3). Post-hoc comparisons using Tukey tests revealed that the interaction was 
driven by a significant increase in confidence ratings between the initial and post-feedback 
presentations of ambiguous endorsed stimuli (p < 10-4), effect that was not observed for 
distinct stimuli. 
A separate 2 (position: initial/second presentation) X 2 (type of feedback: endorsed/disputed) 
ANOVA was performed on the confidence ratings for ambiguous stimuli alone, examining 
confidence rating before and after endorsement and dispute. This analysis revealed significant 
main effects of position (F(1, 16) = 5.75, p < .05) and type of feedback (F(1, 16) = 12.3, p < 
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10-3), with endorsement leading to higher confidence ratings than dispute. A significant 
interaction was also found between position and type of feedback (F(1, 16) = 12.3, p < 10-3), 
which was due to the fact that confidence ratings rose significantly after endorsement 
compared to the initial rating (Tukey post-hoc; p < .05), but decreased after dispute (p < 10-
4).  
Results of the self-report questionnaire revealed that 64.7% of the participants always believed 
in the social cue, 17.65% stated that they believed in it occasionally and 17.65% (3 subjects) 
reported that they did not. Participants reporting disbelief in feedback authenticity 
nevertheless showed confidence ratings of 71% for ambiguous probes following social 
endorsement, compared to 68.4% prior to social feedback. Their mean confidence level 
following disagreement was 69.3%. The differences in the sceptical group, reveal that that 
they were influenced by the valence of the cue in spite of their apparent disbelief.  
3.2.3.2. ELECTROPHYSIOLOGICAL RESULTS 
Initial stimulus presentation  
Posterior P2 amplitude. The ANOVA showed a significant main effect of ambiguity (F(1,16) 
= 8.08, p < .05). The P2 peak was significantly greater for the initial ambiguous probes (3.8 ± 
2.78 µV), compared to the distinct ones (3.2 ± 2.73 µV) (Figure 21, right).  
Anterior N2 amplitude. The ANOVA revealed a main effect of ambiguity (F(1, 16) = 9.52, p 
< .10-3). The N2 mean amplitudes were significantly more negative for the presentation of 
initial ambiguous probes (-1.52 ± 2.36 µV) compared to the presentation of initial distinct 
probes (-0.83 ± 2.65 µV) prior social feedback (Figure 21, top).  
P3 amplitude. The ANOVA showed a main effect of ambiguity (F(1, 16) = 12.21, p < .10-3). 
The P3 mean amplitude was significantly larger for the presentation of initial distinct probes 
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(3.7 ±2.5 µV) than for the presentation of initial ambiguous probes (2.7 ± 2.2 µV) prior to 
social feedback (Figure 21, left).      
 
Figure 21: ERPs for ambiguous and distinct probes presented before social feedback. Pooled ERP 
traces are shown across electrodes used for the computation of the posterior P2 (right) and anterior N2 
(top), as well as P3 (left), along with collapsed topographical voltage map illustrating the posterior 
P2/anterior N2 and the P3 for the two conditions of ambiguity. Central inset shows scalp viewed from 
above (frontal leads on top, right leads on the right), with electrodes used for P2 and N2 computation 
circled in black, and electrodes used for P3 computation indicated in red. 
Second (post-feedback) stimulus presentation 
Posterior P2 amplitude. The ANOVA performed on P2 mean amplitudes after feedback 
probes revealed no significant differences between the three conditions (F(1.41, 22.6) = .5, 
adj. p > .05) (distinct endorsed = 4.05 ± 2.04 µV, ambiguous endorsed = 4.00  ± 1.9 µV, 
ambiguous disputed = 4.21 ± 2.04 µV).  
Anterior N2 amplitude. The same repeated measures ANOVA for post-feedback probes did 
not reveal any significant effect of social feedback (F(1.74, 28) = .5, p > .05). There were no 
significant differences between the presentation of post-endorsed distinct probes (-2.4 ± 1.9 
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µV), post-endorsed ambiguous probes (-2.1 ± 1.44 µV) and post-disputed ambiguous probes 
(-2.2 ± 1.22 µV). Only a main effect of laterality was observed (F(2, 32) = 7.64, p < 10-3). 
LPP. The ANOVA carried for the 270ms - 370ms window revealed main effects of condition 
(F(1.89, 29.5) = 9.4, p < 10-4) and laterality (F(1.81, 28.9) = 7.8, p < 10-3). Post-hoc 
comparisons using Tukey tests showed that the early posterior positivity mean amplitude was 
significantly larger for distinct endorsed probes (2.3 ± 1.9 µV), compared to both ambiguous 
conditions (ambiguous endorsed = 1.4 ± 1.7 µV, p < 10-5; ambiguous disputed = 1.8 ± 1.6 µV, 
p < 10-5). The mean amplitudes were significantly larger over the right and left hemisphere 
leads (right: 2.4 ± 1.7 µV; left: 2.03 ± 1.9 µV) compared to the midline ones (1.08 ± 1.7 µV). 
The ANOVA for the later LPP window (400ms - 500ms), showed a main effect of condition 
(F(1.32, 21.05) = 4.6, p < .05), with post-hoc Tukey tests showing that mean amplitudes were 
significantly greater for ambiguous disputed probes (2.38 ± 1.5 µV) than the two endorsed 
conditions, while these latter two did not differ significantly (distinct endorsed: 1.71 ± 1.5 µV;  
p < .05; ambiguous endorsed: 1.65 ± 1.5 µV;  p < .05) (Fig. 22). 
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Figure 22: ERPs for stimuli presented after social feedback. Traces obtained from the pooled electrodes 
indicated in the inset are illustrated for distinct endorsed, ambiguous endorsed and ambiguous disputed 
stimuli. The two periods of investigation (270ms- 370ms and 400ms- 500ms) are separated by a black 
line between 370 and 400ms.  
 
3.2.4. DISCUSSION 
The behavioural results in this study showed that participants believed in the authenticity of 
the social feedback and modified their responses accordingly.  
The ERPs obtained for the initial presentation of the ambiguous stimuli showed an enhanced 
posterior P2/anterior N2 amplitude starting at around 200ms. These increases in P2/N2 
amplitudes are in line with other findings in the literature that have demonstrated similar 
responses under conditions of uncertainty (Gole et al., 2012; Wang, Sun, Li & Meng, 2018). 
The P3 component was greater for distinct stimuli. The P3 has been interpreted as reflecting 
different functions. One suggestion is that it represents attentional engagement (Polich, 2007). 
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Indeed, it has been noted that under more demanding task conditions, the P3 amplitude is 
decreased, contrary to less demanding situations (Kok, 2001; Olofsson & Polich, 2007). In 
our investigation, the increased difficulty for ambiguous stimuli may have necessitated greater 
attentional engagement leading to a decreased P3 component. Alternatively, a more recent 
interpretation has been advanced suggesting that the P3 may be a marker of neural activity 
which could be linked to metacognition. The term metacognition denotes the explicit 
representations an agent has of their cognitive processes and can be more broadly defined as 
cognition about cognition (Shea et al., 2014). This self-reflective ability is thought to increase 
in the face of uncertainty. Recent investigations have examined the relation between the P3 
and the participants’ certainty with regards to the stimulus (Desender et al., 2016). Using target 
detection tasks, it has been observed that as sensory evidence builds up with increasing 
evidence, participants’ accuracy increases, and the P3 builds up more rapidly, peaking earlier 
and with a greater amplitude (Kelly & O’Connell, 2013; Murphy et al., 2015; Twomey et al., 
2015). This has led to the suggestion that the P3 may act as a “decision variable” reflecting 
the accumulation of sensory information that culminates with the participant’ decision (Kelly 
et al., 2013). This finding could also account for our observations, in which more distinct 
colours would have led to a rapid build-up of sensory evidence allowing an unequivocal 
response, which was lacking for ambiguous colours.   
Although P2/N2 and P3 differences were found prior to feedback, the ERPs observed after 
social feedback differed quite clearly. Indeed, the enhanced P2 / N2 responses for ambiguous 
stimuli were no longer observed and no P3 topography was found. This appears to suggest 
that when viewing the stimulus a second time, the subsequent attentional engagement (or 
build-up of sensory information) did not occur. Instead, an LPP after approximately 350ms 
differentiated disputed and endorsed stimuli.  
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Different interpretations could be advanced for this LPP. Firstly, it could be speculated that 
social feedback modulated the emotional value of the stimulus. Indeed, emotionally-valenced 
stimuli have been found to activate a similar late component. Ito et al. (Ito, Larsen, Smith & 
Cacioppo, 1998) reported a late centro-parietal positivity for emotional stimuli that was more 
marked for negative images, when these were set in a context of neutral images. The finding 
was replicated by Huang & Luo (Huang & Luo, 2006) for negative images in a valence 
judgment task. Others have reported a similar component for both positively and negatively-
valenced stimuli (e.g. Hajcak et al., 2010; Cuthbert, Schupp, Bradley, Birbaumer & Lang, 
2000; Schupp, Cuthbert, Bradley, Cacioppo, Ito & Lang, 2000; Dolcos & Cabeza, 2002). In 
this context, the LPP may be an indication of an emotional appraisal of the stimuli due to their 
“incorrect” classification by the participant. Alternately, their emotional value may have led 
to changes in attentional engagement.  
3.2.5. CONCLUSION 
Within the current context, it might therefore be argued that social disagreement enhances 
stimulus reprocessing due to what we would term a social epistemic discrepancy, created by 
the divergence between the participants’ judgment and the dominating social opinion. This 
appears to modify the emotional value of the stimulus and to bring about later processes 
causing the ambiguous stimulus to gain a different emotional value.  
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3.3. STUDY 3: AM I REALLY SEEING WHAT’S AROUND ME ? AN 
ERP STUDY ON SOCIAL ANXIETY UNDER SPEECH INDUCTION, 
UNCERTIANTY AND SOCIAL FEEDBACK3 
 
Keywords: Social anxiety, Uncertainty, Ambiguity, Early Attention, Social feedback, ERPs 
  Abstract 
Cognitive models of social anxiety propose that socially anxious individuals engage in 
early excessive self-focusing attention when entering a social situation manifested by 
hypervigilance towards threatening social stimuli. However, it remains unclear whether 
their fear to socially threatening information unfolds during the social context or rather 
before the social-evaluative event, impacting on early visual and attentional processes to 
external stimuli. To address this question, the present study used a novel paradigm in which 
participants were assigned to a socially anxious group or control group on the basis of their 
score at the Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale. Before the experimental procedure, speech 
anxiety was induced to all participants who believed they would be making a presentation 
in front of an audience of three psychologists at the end of the experiment. During the 
recording of event-related-potentials, participants were asked to judge the hues of distinct, 
or ambiguously coloured stimuli, and to indicate their confidence ratings. Alleged social 
feedback was then provided, either endorsing or disputing the participant’s responses. 
Participants were then presented the stimulus a second time and given the option to 
reconsider their decision. Behaviourally, results indicated that confidence levels were 
decreased for all participants following disputed feedback, whereas revised judgments were 
increased post-disputed feedback. This pattern was strengthened among socially anxious 
individuals. ERP data showed greater occipital P1 amplitudes for ambiguous probes  
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(3) Reprint of: Zanesco, J. (2019). Am I really seeing what’s around me? An ERP study on 
social anxiety under speech induction, uncertainty and social feedback (under review) 
compared to distinct ones upon initial stimulus presentations, and this, for both groups, 
compatible with heightened sensory facilitation to ambiguous information. However, P1 
amplitudes for all conditions were reduced among socially anxious individuals, 
suggesting a reduction in sensory facilitation of visual information among the latter. 
Moreover, a decreased frontal N1 was also found for both initial and post-feedback 
conditions among socially anxious subjects compared to controls. This component also 
distinguished disputed conditions from endorsed ones, in both groups of participants. 
During the presentation of social feedback, P1 was not modulated by the level of social 
anxiousness. However, the N170 amplitudes were increased for faces following 
ambiguous probes and were earlier to faces indicating agreement compared to 
disagreement, without distinguishing socially anxious subjects from healthy ones. The 
findings provide evidence for the role of anticipation of social situations among socially 
anxious individuals manifested by a reduction in early attention to external stimuli due 
to excessive self-focusing. 
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3.3.1. INTRODUCTION 
Social anxiety disorder (SAD) is one of the most common psychiatric disorders with a 
prevalence rate 12 to 15% among the general population and with only 10 to 20% of 
individuals asking for therapeutic counselling (Fumark, Tillfors, Everz, Marteinsdottir, 
Gefvert & Fredrikson, 1999). According to the most prominent cognitive models of social 
anxiety (Clark & Wells, 1995; Williams et al., 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 1988; Matthews & 
Mackintosh, 1998; Eysenck et al., 2007; Bar-Haim et al., 2007), the disorder is characterised 
by heightened self-focused attention when anticipating or entering a social situation and 
impaired attentional disengagement from threatening social stimuli (Taylor, Cross & Amir, 
2016). In a social situation, attention may be internally oriented (thoughts, emotions, 
behaviours) or externally oriented (environment, ongoing tasks…). In the case of social 
anxiety, attention is oriented internally giving rise to enhanced awareness of anxiety symptoms 
contributing to the fear of failing and thus to the maintenance of the disorder. 
A wealth of behavioural research has assessed the attentional biases by measuring reaction 
times and eye movement data in experimental tasks with emotional face expressions such as 
the modified dot probe task (MacLeod, Mathews & Tata, 1986), the modified Stroop task 
(Stroop, 1935), visual search tasks (Öhman, Flykt & Esteves, 2001) and spatial cueing tasks 
(Posner, 1980) (for a review see Cisler & Koster, 2010). Overall, these studies do not accord 
on the components and mechanisms of attentional processing biases toward threat. It still 
remains unclear whether it is about excessive attention to threat (Gamble & Rapee, 2010; Boll, 
Bartholomaeus, Peter, Lupke & Gamer, 2016; Holas, Krejtz, Cypryanska & Nezlek, 2014), 
difficulty to disengage attention from threat (Amir, Elias, Klumpp & Przeworski, 2003, 
Moriya & Tanno, 2011),  attentional avoidance from threat (e.g. MacLeod et al., 1986; 
Moukheiber, Rautureau, Perez-Diaz, Soussignan, Dubal, Jouvent & Pelissolo, 2010), impaired 
inhibition control and shifting functions (Eysenck & Derakshan, 2011; Taylor et al., 2016) or 
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even a lack of biases in social anxiety considering the positive attentional bias in the non-
anxious population towards positive stimuli (Schofield, Inhoff & Coles, 2013). Some studies 
showed that the SAD is associated to both hypervigilance and attentional avoidance (Chen, 
Thomas, Clarke, Hickie & Guastella, 2015). It seems though that the investigation of the 
stages of information processing is key to understand the integration of attentional and 
mediating mechanisms at work in social anxious individuals. Taken together, this body of 
research shows that there are two stages of processing, an automatic preconscious stage 
followed by a strategic processing stage (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). The excessive attention 
to threatening social stimuli is observed shortly after stimulus presentation. This early 
hypervigilance for faces occurring at around 150 ms (Gamble & Rapee, 2010; Boll et al., 
2016) is followed by a delayed disengagement at around 300 ms after the presentation of angry 
faces (Moriya & Tanno, 2011). Subsequently, social anxious individuals will avoid the threat 
in a strategic controlled manner. These last two stages can be modulated by executive control 
capacities (shifting and inhibition) as well as through emotional regulation strategies in order 
to avoid avoidance (Cisler & Koster, 2010).  
Some recent studies have explored these attentional components using eye-tracking measures 
and reported discordant results. For example, Moukheiber et al. (2010) observed a lower 
number of fixations and dwell time in the eye area for the different basic emotions, making 
eye avoidance a behavioural phenotype in SAD. Other studies using eye measures (Gamble 
& Rapee, 2010; Holas et al., 2014; Boll et al., 2016) observed hypervigilance in early stages 
at around 150 ms, manifested by a greater proportion of fixations towards emotional faces or 
faster initial orienting towards negative face emotions. 
The discrepancy between results in behavioural and eye tracking studies may be due to the 
fact that behavioural tasks are not adequate to explore the temporal dynamics in socially 
anxious individuals, whereas eye movement measures lack sensitivity to unconscious shifts in 
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attention (Felmingham, Stewart, Kemp & Carr, 2016). Thus, electrocortical measures such as 
event-related potential (ERPs), thanks to their high temporal resolution, can inform on the 
temporal unfolding of neural activation in response to socially threatening stimuli. Several 
ERP studies have explored early attentional processes during the presentation of emotional 
expressions in highly socially anxious and social phobic individuals (for a review see: 
Harrewijn, Schmidt, Westenberg, Tang & Van der Molen, 2017). Overall, results indicate that 
P1, an early positive wave peaking around 100 ms after stimulus presentation (Luck, 2014), 
is increased in response to emotional faces in socially anxious individuals, suggesting 
enhanced sensory processing to socially threatening stimuli (e.g. Peschard et al., 2013; 
Rossignol et al., 2012, 2013; Mueller et al., 2009; Morel et al., 2014). Results on the N170, a 
face sensitive negative potential peaking between 130 and 200 ms, revealed no differences in 
N170 amplitudes between socially anxious individuals and healthy controls (e.g. Morel et al., 
2014; Tsuji & Shimada, 2017, Li, Yu, Ye, Chen, Xie, Zhu & Wang, 2017).  However, these 
studies did not examine the effect of social feedback, via emotional expressions indicating 
agreement or disagreement, on early perceptual processes during the presentation of 
ambiguous stimuli. In a previous study, Zanesco et al. (2018) investigated these early brain 
modulations under social pressure and showed that stimulus ambiguity and social feedback 
influenced early ERP components as well as later metacognitive processes (Zanesco et al., 
2019). Thus, the temporal aspects of brain activation to ambiguous visual stimuli, before and 
after social feedback, in the social anxious population, remain largely unknown. 
The present study focused on the early cognitive processes at play in situations of uncertainty 
caused by stimulus ambiguity, when conflicting social feedback was provided. Uncertainty 
has been shown to be an important transdiagnostic variable in SAD (Oglesby et al., 2016) as 
socially anxious individuals tend to interpret ambiguous information as more threatening than 
non-socially anxious individuals (Constans et al., 1999). To address this question, an ERP 
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investigation was carried out using a novel paradigm (see Zanesco et al., 2018 for details), in 
which distinct or ambiguous colour stimuli were presented to participants, who were asked to 
judge the colour and rate the degree of certainty in their judgment. They were then provided 
with an alleged social feedback that either endorsed or disputed the participants’ response. 
The same stimuli were then shown again and participants were given the option to maintain 
or revise their decision and confidence rate. Furthermore, the present study induced social 
anxiety to all participants by making them believe they would be presenting their subjective 
experience in front of three psychologists at the end of the experiment. 
Since ambiguous situations and disagreement from the social majority increase uncertainty 
about the response in the general population (Cialdini & Golstein, 2004), we hypothesised that 
highly socially anxious individuals would revise their judgment more often than healthy 
controls after a disputing social feedback compared to an endorsed one. Additionally, socially 
anxious subjects would present lower levels of confidence for ambiguous compared to distinct 
stimuli, but higher levels of confidence following an endorsing social cue compared to a 
disputed cue. 
From an electrophysiological point of view, we focused on the visual P1 and N1 components 
locked to the presentation of the probe stimuli (coloured squares), before and after social 
feedback. The occipital P1 component has been interpreted to reflect facilitation of early 
sensory processing for stimuli presented in a location where attention is focused, whereas the 
anterior N1 represents the orienting of attention to a task-relevant stimulus (Luck et al., 1990). 
It was expected that initial ambiguous stimuli would produce greater P1/N1 amplitudes than 
initial distinct ones. After the social feedback, it was predicted that ambiguous stimuli 
following a social feedback in disagreement would generate enhanced P1/N1 amplitudes 
compared to the endorsed conditions. The effects on P1 and N1 were expected to be larger for 
the social anxious group compared to controls. Moreover, and based on the literature, P1 
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locked to the social feedback, was expected to be greater for faces indicating disagreement 
compared to agreement as this component is thought to reflect rapid emotional processing 
based on elementary visual information (Vuilleumier & Poutois. 2007).  Concerning the N170, 
which reflects the structural encoding of faces, only one study, using a modified Stroop task, 
revealed an increased N170 amplitude for angry faces in socially anxious individuals 
compared to patients with social spider phobia and healthy controls (Kolassa & Miltner, 2006). 
This study used entire pictures of faces.  However, most other studies, using schematic or 
cropped faces, did not observe any influence of social anxiety on N170 modulations (e.g. 
Peschard et al., 2013; Rossignol et al., 2012). In the present study, we used entire faces with 
direct gaze. Thus, the use of more ecological stimuli may lead to N170 differences in 
amplitude or latency between socially anxious subjects and healthy subjects as well as between 
disputed and endorsed social cues. 
3.3.2. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
3.3.2.1. PARTICIPANTS 
Twenty-five paid participants were recruited for this study. Three participants were excluded 
due to high number of artifacts. The final sample was therefore composed of 22 participants 
(16 females and 6 males; mean age = 23.3  2.9). All were right-handed, had normal or 
corrected to-normal vision.  Twelve subjects had no self-reported psychiatric or neurological 
disorder, while ten participants reported having social anxiety and were recruited on this basis.  
Participants were allocated to either the control group (12 subjects; 7 women) or the 
experimental social anxious group (10 subjects; 9 women) upon completion of the French 
version (Yao, Note, Fanget, Albuisson, Bouvard, Jalenques & Cottraux, 1999) of the 
Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (LSAS) (Liebowitz, 1987; see annex 1). The LSAS is a 24-
item scale scored on a 0 to 3 Likert scale assessing two key dimensions of social anxiety across 
a variety of situations. The first dimension refers to the level of fear or anxiousness in a 
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particular situation. The second dimension refers to how often the situation is avoided. Scores 
range from 0 to 144 points, and the cut off is situated at 56 points representing moderate 
anxiety. Scores above 80 are associated with severe social anxiety and scores above 95 points, 
with very severe social anxiety. Thus, subjects scoring at or above 56 constituted the social 
anxious group and subjects scoring below the cut-off made up the control group. The French 
version of the LSAS has been shown to present a high empirical and concurrent validity (r-
Pearson between 0.49 and 0.69) and it differentiates socially anxious subjects from non-
clinical ones (Yao et al., 1999). None of the participants were diagnosed with social anxiety 
and none were students in psychology. They were paid 50 Swiss francs for their participation. 
The study was approved by the local ethics committee (University of Geneva) and was 
performed in agreement with the Declaration of Helsinki. 
3.3.2.2. STIMULI AND EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE 
The procedure and stimuli have been described elsewhere (Zanesco et al., 2018). Briefly, a 
fixation cross was presented (400 - 600ms) followed by the probe stimulus (700ms) that was 
a square stimulus (5.73°) that was either of a distinct blue or green colour (16 stimuli), or of 
an ambiguous green/blue hue (16 stimuli controlled for isoluminance, ranging from 
28.17cd/m2 - 30.72 cd/m2). After the stimulus, a response prompt (self-paced) appeared 
asking the participant to decide whether the stimulus was green or blue. Participants were then 
asked to rate their level of certainty in their response on a scale from 1 to 5. 
They were then presented with a face (1000ms) which they were told reflected the judgement 
of the majority of previous participants, and which expressed either disgust (disagreement) or 
joy (endorsement). The stimulus sequence was then repeated, in the same order and 
participants were required to maintain or to revise their decision.  The faces used for social 
feedback were 10 male and 10 female identities expressing happiness or disgust, taken from 
the Radboud Faces Database (Langner et al., 2010). 
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Prior to the recording, social anxiety was induced by telling participants that at the end of the 
task, three psychologists would ask them to give their subjective feeling during the 
experiment. Furthermore, participants were asked to complete the French version of the 
Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (LSAS) (Liebowitz, 1987).  
3.3.2.3. EEG ACQUISITION 
EEG was recorded using a 64-channel Biosemi Active-Two system (Amsterdam, 
Netherlands) with AG/AgC1 electrodes positioned according to the extended 10-20 system. 
Four additional flat electrodes, which were placed on the outer canthi of the eyes and above 
and under the right eye, in order to capture the eye movements and blinks. Each active 
electrode is represented with an impedance value, which was kept below 20 kΩ for each 
participant. The EEG was continuously recorded with a sampling rate of 1024 Hz. Data was 
re-referenced off-line against the average reference (electrode positions are shown in Fig. 23). 
 
3.2.2.4. EEG PROCESSING 
Standard processing of EEG data was done offline using the software Brain Vision Analyzer 
V.2 (Brain Products, Gilching, Germany). The data was downsampled to 512Hz and filtered 
between 0.1Hz and 30Hz. Bad electrodes were interpolated using a spherical spline (1.4% of 
the electrodes were interpolated). Eye movements and blinks were corrected (Gratton et al., 
1983) and trials containing artefacts were removed (14%).  
3.3.2.5. BEHAVIOURAL ANALYSIS 
Behaviourally, mean confidence ratings were compared for each participant separately for 
initial and post-feedback presentations and for each condition. Additionally, fluctuations in 
confidence ratings between initial and post-feedback probes were also examined. Finally, 
trials in which participants revised their judgement after social feedback were counted as 
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“revisions”. Mean number of revisions was calculated according to the ambiguity of the probe 
and the valence of the social cue.  
Statistical analysis of mean confidence rates was performed using two repeated measures 
ANOVA. For the initial presentation of stimuli, a 2x2 ANOVA was carried out using the mean 
confidence rate as the dependent variable, the group (control / social anxious) as the between- 
subject factor and the condition (initial ambiguous / initial distinct) as the within subject factor. 
To examine the effect of social feedback on subjective confidence, a 2x3 ANOVA was carried 
out using mean confidence rate as the dependent variable, the group (control /social anxious) 
as the between-subject factor and the condition (ambiguous endorsed/ distinct endorsed/ 
ambiguous disputed) as within-subject factor. To examine the increase or decrease in 
confidence rate between initial and post-feedback probes, we used a 2x3 repeated measures 
ANOVA, with the percentage of fluctuation as the dependent variable, the group (control / 
social anxious) as the between-subject factor and the condition (ambiguous endorsed/ distinct 
endorsed/ ambiguous disputed)  as the within-subject factor. 
The number of revisions for each group was investigated using an ANOVA with the mean 
number of revisions as dependent variable, the group (control /social anxious) as the between-
subject factor and the condition (ambiguous endorsed/ distinct endorsed/ ambiguous disputed) 
as the within-subject factor.  
3.3.2.6. ELECTROPHYSIOLOGICAL RECORDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
ERPs were computed for distinct and ambiguous stimuli in the initial presentation between 
200ms to 700ms using the 200ms prestimulus period for baseline correction. For the post-
feedback stimulus presentations, ERPs were computed for ambiguous endorsed, ambiguous 
disputed and distinct endorsed conditions. For the social feedback presentation, ERPs were 
computed for faces expressing agreement (happy expressions) and disagreement (disgust 
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expressions). The latter, following ambiguous stimuli and the former following ambiguous or 
distinct stimuli. In order to maintain credibility, our design did not include any social dispute 
for distinct probes. Following visual inspection, the P1, N1 amplitudes were retained for 
statistical investigation for the initial and post-feedback presentations. For the social feedback 
presentation, we retained the P1 and the N170 components. When necessary, adjusted p-values 
were used to control for sphericity. 
Initial stimulus presentations 
Visual inspection showed differences on the posterior P1, and on the anterior N1 components. 
The time windows for analysis were subsequently determined on the basis of the peaks and 
means observed in the grand averages across all conditions using a collapsed localizer. The 
P1 peaks (80ms - 140ms) were determined using a semi-automatic peak detection method and 
were measured over electrodes on the left (O1), right (O2) and midline (Oz) scalp (Fig. 23). 
Peaks for the anterior N1 (60-150ms) were measured over the left (F1, FC1), midline (Fz, 
FCz) and right (F2, FC2) frontal electrodes (Fig. 23). These early stages of processing were 
investigated for each component, with a repeated measures ANOVA using difficulty (initial 
distinct / initial ambiguous) and laterality (left/ midline/ right) as within-subject factors, and 
the group (control /social anxious) as the between-subject factor.  
Post-feedback stimulus presentations 
The same electrodes and time windows were used to compute the peak amplitudes on the P1 
and N1 components for the post-feedback probe presentations (Fig. 24). The repeated 
measures ANOVA was carried out using the group (control/ social anxious) as between-
subject factor and the three conditions (distinct endorsed / ambiguous endorsed/ ambiguous 
disputed) and laterality (left / midline / right) as within subject-factors. 
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Social feedback presentations 
ERPs were computed separately for happy faces (indicating agreement / endorsement) and 
disgusted faces (indicating disagreement/ dispute) and were further examined separately when 
they followed a distinct or an ambiguous probe. The P1 and N170 time-locked to the social 
feedback were identified on the basis of the grand average across all condition. In this manner, 
the time window for the P1 peak amplitude was observed between 60ms and 130ms and 
measured over posterior left (PO7, O1), midline (Oz) and right (PO8, O2) electrodes. The 
N170 peak and latency values were observed on temporo-parietal sites (left: P7, P9 and right: 
P8, P10) between 120 ms and 180 ms (Fig. 25). 
3.3.3. RESULTS 
3.3.3.1. BEHAVIOURAL RESULTS 
The one-way ANOVA performed on the score of social anxiety revealed, as expected, a 
significantly higher scoring within the social anxious group (83 ± 18.7) compared to the 
control group (33.83 ±12.62), (F(1,20) = 53.84, p < 10-7). 
Results of the self-report questionnaire revealed that 32% (7 subjects) of participants always 
believed in the social feedback, 55% (12 subjects) stated that they believed in it occasionally, 
while 14% reported not believing in the social feedback. The latter, nevertheless, revised on 
average 8% of their judgments following the social feedback, compared to 7% for those stating 
believing occasionally or reporting always believing in the social feedback. Globally, the 
average percentage credibility reached 72% for the control group and 73% for the social 
anxious group. A one-way ANOVA did not reveal any significant differences between both 
groups in terms of credibility in the social cue (F(1, 20) = .013, p >.05). 
The number of revisions was significantly higher in the social anxious group (34.7 ± 18.5) 
relative to the control group (19.3 ± 8.3), (F(1, 20) = 6.68, p < .05). The ANOVA performed 
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on the mean number of revisions revealed a significant main effect of group, (F(1,20) = 6.7, p 
< .05), of condition, (F(1.1, 22.1) = 29.7, p < 10-5), as well as an interaction between group 
and condition, (F(1.1, 22.1) = 5.9, p < 10-3). For the main effect of group, mean revisions after 
feedback were significantly higher in the social anxious group (11.6) compared to the control 
group (6.4). For the main effect of condition, post-hoc comparisons revealed that the mean 
number of revisions was significantly higher following a disputed feedback (20.9) compared 
to both endorsed conditions (ambiguous endorsed: 5.2; distinct endorsed: 0.9) (p < 10-4). For 
the interaction between group and condition, post-hoc comparisons using Tukey tests revealed 
that the mean number of revisions was significantly higher for disputed ambiguous probes in 
the social anxious group (28.9) compared to the control group (12.9) (p < 10-3). 
The ANOVA performed on the mean confidence ratings for the initial probes revealed a main 
effect of condition, (F(1, 20) = 149.2, p < 10-7). Mean confidence ratings were significantly 
higher for initial distinct probes (95.3%) compared to initial ambiguous probes (73.5%), and 
this for both groups. After the social feedback, the ANOVA showed a main effect of condition, 
(F(1.98, 39.5) = 65.5, p < 10-6). Post-hoc comparisons using Tukey tests revealed that the 
significant differences were between all three conditions (distinct endorsed: 96.5%, 
ambiguous endorsed: 80.7%, ambiguous disputed: 71.8%), (ambiguous endorsed vs 
ambiguous disputed: p < 10-3; ambiguous endorsed and ambiguous disputed vs distinct 
endorsed: p < 10-4),  with the lowest mean confidence rate for ambiguous disputed.  
Finally, an ANOVA for repeated measures was carried out on the percentage fluctuation 
between initial and post-feedback confidence ratings. This analysis revealed a main effect of 
condition, (F(1.27, 25.5) = 13.06; p < 10-5). Post-hoc comparison using Tukey tests revealed 
a significantly increase in confidence rate from initial to post-feedback probes after ambiguous 
endorsed probes (+10.14%) compared to distinct endorsed (+1.4%) and to ambiguous disputed 
probes (-2.3%).  
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In summary, the behavioural results showed that most participants considered the social 
feedback to be credible, adjusting their subjective confidence ratings accordingly. The level 
of confidence was higher for distinct probes compared to ambiguous ones and higher for 
ambiguous endorsed probes compared to ambiguous disputed probes. Although this pattern 
was similar for both groups, socially anxious individuals showed a higher tendency to increase 
their confidence rates after endorsed social cues compared to controls, as well as to decrease 
their confidence ratings after disputed social feedback in comparison to controls. 
 
3.3.3.2. ELECTROPHYSIOLOGICAL RESULTS 
Initial stimulus presentation  
Posterior P1 amplitude. The repeated measures ANOVA showed a significant main effect of 
group (F(1, 20) = 4.5, p < .05), of condition (F(1, 20) = 13.9, p < .10-3),  and an interaction 
between condition and laterality, (F(1.9, 39.8) =4.7, p < .05). The P1 peak amplitude was 
significantly greater for the control group (7.4 ± 2.6 µV) than for the social anxious group (5.2 
± 2.8 µV). For the main effect of condition, the P1 was significantly larger for the initial 
ambiguous probes (6.85 ± 2.8 µV), compared to the presentation of initial distinct probes (5.9 
± 2.9 µV) (Fig. 23). For the interaction, post-hoc comparisons using Tukey tests revealed 
larger P1 amplitudes for ambiguous probes compared to distinct ones over the midline scalp 
(ambiguous: 7.3 µV; distinct: 5.9 µV), compared  to the right (ambiguous: 6.3 µV; distinct: 
5.6 µV), and left (ambiguous: 6.7 µV; distinct: 5.8 µV) (p < .10-4) hemisphere leads. However, 
there were no significant differences in laterality for distinct probes.  
Anterior N1 amplitude. The ANOVA performed on N1 peak amplitudes revealed a main 
effect of group, (F(1, 20) = 7.6, p < .05), and laterality, (F(1.8, 36.5) = 3.3, p < .05). The N1 
peak amplitudes were significantly more negative for the control group (-3.43 ± 0.8 µV) than 
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for the social anxious group (-2.34 ± 1.1 µV) (Fig. 23). For the main effect of laterality, N1 
was found to be significantly larger over midline hemisphere leads (-2.96 µV) compared to 
left hemisphere leads (-2.77 µV) (p < .05). 
 
Figure 23. ERPs for ambiguous and distinct probes presented before social feedback. Pooled ERP 
traces are shown across electrodes used for the computation of the posterior P1 (right) and anterior N1 
(left), along with collapsed topographical voltage map illustrating the posterior P1 and anterior N1 for 
the two conditions of ambiguity and for the two groups (control vs social anxious). Central inset shows 
scalp viewed from above (frontal leads on top, right leads on the right), with electrodes used for P1 
and N1 computation circled in black and grey, respectively. 
 
Second (post-feedback) stimulus presentation 
Posterior P1 amplitude. The ANOVA performed on P1 peak amplitudes post-feedback probes 
revealed significant main effects of group, (F(1, 20) = 6.6, p < .05), and condition, (F(2, 40) = 
17.8, p < 10-6). P1 amplitudes were significantly larger for the control group (7.7 ± 2.3 µV) 
than for the social anxious group (4.9 ± 3.2 µV) for all three conditions (distinct endorsed, 
ambiguous endorsed and ambiguous disputed). For the main effect of condition, post-hoc 
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comparisons using Tukey tests revealed a larger P1 for ambiguous conditions (ambiguous 
endorsed: 6.6 ± 3.07 µV; ambiguous disputed: 6.9 ± 3.2 µV) compared to distinct endorsed 
(5.7 ± 2.9 µV) (p < 10-4) (Fig. 24). 
Anterior N1 amplitude. The same repeated measures ANOVA for post-feedback probes 
carried for the 60 ms – 150 ms time window, showed main effects of group, (F(1, 20) = 11.05, 
p < 10-3), condition, (F(2, 40) = 3.6, p < .05), and laterality, (F(1.3, 26.3) = 7.2, p < 10-3). For 
the main effect of group, the anterior N1was significantly more negative for the control group 
(-3.9 ± 1.2 µV) than for the social anxious group (-2.3 ± 1.3 µV). For the main effect of 
condition, post-hoc comparisons using Tukey tests revealed that the early anterior negativity 
peak amplitude was significantly larger for ambiguous disputed (-3.4 ± 1.6 µV) compared to 
both endorsed conditions (ambiguous endorsed: -3.01 ± 1.3 µV; distinct endorsed: -3.03 ± 1.4 
µV) (p < .05) (Fig. 24). Additionally, the mean peak N1 amplitudes were significantly larger 
over midline hemisphere leads (-3.23 µV) compared to left ones (-2.94 µV) (p < 10-3). 
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Figure 24: ERPs for stimuli presented after social feedback. Pooled ERP traces are shown across 
electrodes used for the computation of the posterior P1 (left) and anterior N1 (right), along with 
collapsed topographical voltage map illustrating the posterior P1 and anterior N1 for the three 
conditions (distinct endorsed, ambiguous endorsed, ambiguous disputed) and for the two groups 
(control vs social anxious). Central inset shows scalp viewed from above (frontal leads on top, right 
leads on the right), with electrodes used for P1 and N1 computation circled in black and grey, 
respectively. 
 
Social feedback presentation.  
Posterior P1 amplitude. The ANOVA carried out on the occipital P1 time-locked to the faces 
(social cues) in the 60-130 ms time window, revealed a main effect of laterality, (F(2, 40) = 
7.3, p < 10-3). Post-hoc comparisons using Tukey tests showed that P1 peak amplitudes were 
significantly larger over the right (8.14 µV), and left (7.9 µV) hemisphere leads compared to 
midline ones (5.83 µV) (Fig. 25). 
N170 amplitude and latency. The 2 (group: control/social anxious) x 3 (condition: ambiguous 
endorsed/ distinct endorsed/ ambiguous disputed) x 2 (laterality: left/right) ANOVA 
performed on the N170 peak amplitudes in the 120-180 ms time window, revealed main 
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effects of condition, (F(1.5, 29.3) = 6.3, p < .05),  laterality, (F(1, 20) = 6.6, p < .05), and an 
interaction between condition, laterality and group, (F(1.9, 37.7) = 3.4, p < .05). Post-hoc 
comparisons showed that N170 amplitudes were significantly larger for both ambiguous 
conditions (ambiguous endorsed: -5.6 ± 5.6µV; ambiguous disputed: -5.9 ± 5.7 µV) compared 
to distinct endorsed (-4.7 ± 5.5 µV) (ambiguous endorsed vs distinct endorsed: p < .05) 
(ambiguous disputed vs distinct endorsed: p < 10-3) (Fig. 25). The N170 amplitude was 
significantly larger over the right hemisphere (-6.6 µV) than over the left one (-4.3 µV). 
Whereas these differences in laterality were observed for the three conditions in the control 
group, they were absent in the ambiguous endorsed condition for the social anxious group. 
Interestingly, the ANOVA performed on the N170 latency also revealed a main effect of 
condition, (F(1.3, 25.5) = 11.2, p < 10-3). Post-hoc comparison showed a significantly earlier 
N170 for both endorsed conditions (ambiguous endorsed: 147.8 ± 11.3 ms, distinct endorsed: 
147.7 ± 10.7 ms) compared to the disputed one (151.9 ± 14.01 ms), thus discriminating 
disagreement from agreement (p < 10-4) (Fig.25). 
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Figure 25: ERPs for social feedback. ERPs for endorsing cues post-ambiguous and post-distinct probes 
and for disputed cues post-ambiguous probes compared to an endorsing cue post-distinct probes Pooled 
ERP traces are shown across electrodes used for the computation of the posterior P1 (left) and  N170 
(right), along with collapsed topographical voltage map illustrating the posterior P1 and N170 for the 
three conditions and for the two groups (control vs social anxious). Central inset shows scalp viewed 
from above (frontal leads on top, right leads on the right), with electrodes used for P1 and N170 
computation circled in black and grey, respectively. 
 
3.3.4. DISCUSSION 
The purpose of the present study was to explore the effect of perceptual uncertainty and social 
influence on early attentional processes in a socially anxious population compared to healthy 
controls. In particular, the focus was on the neural responses to ambiguous stimuli other than 
face expressions. 
Behaviourally, and as expected, results showed that all participants, when faced with 
ambiguous stimuli, revised their judgements more often following social disagreement than 
following social endorsement. Importantly, the number of revisions after disputing feedback 
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was higher in the social anxious group, confirming the stronger influence of disputing social 
feedback on social anxious individuals. Additionally, all participants presented lower 
confidence ratings for initial ambiguous probes compared to initial distinct probes. After the 
social feedback, mean confidence ratings were lower for ambiguous disputed probes. 
However, socially anxious individuals showed a tendency to increase their confidence ratings 
compared to controls when the social feedback endorsed their response, and to further 
decrease their subjective confidence level after disputed social feedback in comparison to 
controls, suggesting that social anxious subjects were more sensitive to social approval than 
healthy subjects. The behavioural results indicate increased uncertainty in socially anxious 
subjects (e.g. Harrewijn, Van der Mlen, Van Vliet, Tissier & Westenberg, 2018) and are in 
line with cognitive-behavioural studies (e.g. Cisler & Koster, 2010) showing that socially 
anxious individuals fear social rejection and are less tolerant to uncertainty than healthy 
subjects (Rapee & Heimberg, 1997; Rossignol et al., 2013; Nelson et al., 2015). 
At the electrophysiological level, ERPs measured in response to ambiguous probes revealed 
enhanced P1 for both groups, starting at around 80 ms. The P1 was larger for initial ambiguous 
as well as for post-feedback ambiguous probes, compared to distinct probes. This increase in 
P1 for ambiguous stimuli is in line with findings demonstrating the influence of uncertainty 
produced by perceptual instability of the visual probes (e.g. Dyson, 2011; Klink et al., 2012; 
Reuman, Jacoby, Fabricant, Herring & Abramowitz, 2015) and corroborates the behavioural 
data indicating lower confidence rates for ambiguous probes compared to distinct ones. The 
more ambiguous the visual information, the stronger the brain will respond to it (Zeki, 2006). 
Most importantly, even though the pattern was the same for both groups, P1 amplitudes were 
enhanced for controls compared to socially anxious individuals suggesting less sensory 
facilitation among the latter. This result contradicts most of the studies exploring ERP in the 
social anxious population which indicate an enhanced sensory facilitation in socially anxious 
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individuals as a manifestation of hypervigilance and excessive attention to potential 
threatening information (for a review see: Harrewijn et al., 2018). It could be argued that 
probes, even when ambiguous, are less threatening than facial expressions. Nevertheless, this 
hypothesis does not explain why controls showed an increased P1. Additionally, Peschard et 
al. (2013), demonstrated an increased P1 in socially anxious subjects in response to coloured 
rectangles in a modified Stroop task, suggesting that increased P1 amplitudes may reflect a 
more generic response rather than an early allocation of attention to faces. An alternate 
interpretation for the decreased P1 for all conditions in the social anxious group could be the 
anticipation of the social task creating excessive internal attention and self-focus, thus, 
impairing processing of external stimuli (Clark & Wells, 1995; Deiters et al., 2013; Sluis et 
al., 2017). In the present study, all participants were led to believe they would be giving an 
oral description/presentation at the end of the experiment in front of three psychologists. 
Indeed, it has been noted that the induction of speech anxiety in socially anxious subjects 
creates greater self-focus and task interference (Judah, Grant & Carlisle, 2016). For example, 
Mellings & Alden (2000) observed that high socially anxious individuals recalled less 
environmental features than non-anxious individuals. Thus, these results are in line with Clark 
& Wells ‘s (1995) cognitive model for social anxiety which predicts internally oriented 
attentional resources accompanied by attentional reduction to external social threats.   
The anterior N1 response before social feedback did also distinguish socially anxious subjects 
from control ones. Here again, the N1 was reduced for the former, suggesting that the initial 
probes were less attended by socially anxious individuals compared to controls (Luck et al., 
1990). After the social feedback, N1 amplitudes were enlarged for both groups for ambiguous 
probes following disputed feedback, suggesting an endogenous attentional role of the N1 when 
a relevant discrimination is necessary to perform the task (Hopfinger & West, 2006). This was 
supported by the current study’s findings, which showed an enhanced N1 for ambiguous 
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probes following expressions of disgust compared to expressions of happiness in both groups 
of subjects. Moreover, findings in this study evidenced a decrease in N1 amplitudes for the 
three conditions among socially anxious individuals compared to controls, thus supporting 
Clark & Wells (1995) cognitive model which proposes a reduction in attention to external 
stimuli due to excessive self-focusing in the socially anxious population. Only one recent 
study (Harrewijn et al., 2018), using a social judgment paradigm, observed an increased frontal 
N1 after disputed feedback and interpreted this result as a general pessimism bias in socially 
anxious individuals and a possible candidate endophenotype of SAD. The current results 
corroborate N1‘s sensitivity to negative feedback but not its specificity to SAD as healthy 
subjects also showed defensive motivation when their response did not match the majority. 
Although the aim of the current study was to investigate the effects of social anxiety on 
external non-social ambiguous stimuli within a social context, we also looked at the neural 
responses to social feedback, as ERPs have been widely used to examine processing of 
emotional faces in social anxiety. P1 amplitudes were not modulated by feedback valence. 
The effect was observed later when examining the face sensitivity N170. Findings showed 
greater N170 amplitudes for faces following ambiguous probes compared to distinct ones but 
earlier N170 response to both endorsed conditions (ambiguous and distinct endorsed) 
compared to the disputed condition. Nevertheless, these effects were similar for both groups 
of subjects. Thus, the findings are in line with most studies on socially anxious individuals, 
showing no influence of social anxiety on N170 amplitudes (for a review, see Harrewijn et al., 
2017). Instead, these results suggest a bias in the general population towards the encoding of 
faces expressing agreement. As a consequence, it seems reasonable to conclude that the 
structural analysis of faces in socially anxious subjects is not altered (e.g. Peschard et al., 
2013). 
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The present study had some limitations that should be taken into consideration. First, the 
sample of socially anxious individuals was mainly constituted by female subjects. Thus, future 
studies should investigate these effects of anticipation on external stimuli in a male population. 
Second, the number of participants per group was low, thus reducing the statistical power of 
certain effects. Third, in this study, all participants were told they would be doing a speech at 
the end of the experiment. It would be interesting to add two groups, socially anxious and non-
socially anxious without inducing speech anxiety. Additionally, future studies examining later 
components of executive control may help to better understand individual differences in 
socially anxious individuals, as mechanism of inhibition, mental flexibility and emotional 
regulation, interact with threat anticipation and with visual processing of external cues. 
From a clinical point of view, this investigation may provide further insight into the 
mechanisms and consequences of anticipatory processing in social anxiety and how they 
interact with impaired attention to external stimuli within a social context. Specifically, rather 
than focusing treatments on behavioural exposure of the anxiogenic social situation, 
treatments may want to consider the effects of imagery and interpretation of future social 
situations. Thus, clinical interventions should target negative imagery in anticipation of social 
events as well as unpleasant memory representations of social interactions and concentrate on 
imagery with rescripting techniques (Arntz, 2012) that focus on changing these unpleasant 
memories. 
3.3.5. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the present study provides behaviour and electrophysiological evidence for the 
role of anticipation of social situations among socially anxious individuals manifested by 
lower confidence ratings, higher number of revisions and a reduction in occipital and frontal 
networks which are thought to mediate early attention to external stimuli due to excessive self-
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focusing and self-consciousness. Moreover, findings provide further insight into the clinical 
implications of cognitive- behavioural therapy among socially anxious individuals. 
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4. GENERAL CONCLUSION 
The purpose of the experimental part of this thesis was to identify neural responses of ambiguous 
stimuli processing and its modulation by social feedback (agreement/happy faces vs 
disagreement/disgust faces). For this, we recorded EEG while examining the effects of social 
influence while participants performed a visual discrimination task. The ambiguity of the stimuli 
was used to induce uncertainty whereas distinct stimuli were used to induce certainty.  
In the first study, we focalised on early visual responses by analysing two ERP components, the 
P1 and the N1 over posterior sites. Behaviourally, the number of revised judgments (after social 
feedback) was significantly higher for ambiguous stimuli compared to distinct ones. Moreover, 
when stimuli were ambiguous, the number of revisions was significantly greater following 
disputed social feedback compared to endorsed social feedback. Electrophysiologically, results 
indicated an earlier P1 and N1 for ambiguous probes compared to distinct probes, before and 
after social feedback, suggesting heightened sensory processing and selective attention to stimuli 
inducing uncertainty. The P1 amplitude was also enhanced for ambiguous probes compared to 
distinct ones, although the effect was marginally significant. More specifically, the P1 was 
enhanced for disputed ambiguous probes compared to initial ambiguous probes, even though the 
stimuli were identical. Interestingly, this effect was only observed on the right hemisphere leads 
for ambiguous endorsed probes and was not found for distinct stimuli. These findings suggest 
that social feedback modulates early perceptual processes in visual extrastriate regions 
corroborating the fact that top-down processes interact with bottom-up processes, when stimuli 
become relevant to the task (e.g. Hopfinger & West, 2006; Luck et al., 1990; Hermann & Knight, 
2001). 
In the second study, we focalised on later cognitive processes by exploring three ERP 
components, the posterior P2, the anterior N2 and the occipito-parietal P3. Since the P3 
topography was not found for the post-cue probes, we analysed two-time windows of the late 
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posterior positivity (LPP) following social feedback. Behaviourally, we looked at mean 
subjective confidence ratings before and after social feedback. Results showed higher certainty 
levels for distinct probes and lower confidence ratings for ambiguous disputed probes compared 
to both endorsed conditions, confirming the effect of the social manipulation (e.g. Cialdini & 
Goldstein, 2004; McGarty, Turner, Oakes & Haslam, 1993). From an electrophysiological point 
of view, before social feedback, enhanced P2/N2 amplitudes were observed for ambiguous 
probes compared to distinct probes, whereas the P3 amplitude was larger for initial distinct 
stimuli compared to initial ambiguous stimuli. These findings corroborate that uncertainty 
modulates selective attention starting at 200 ms (e.g. Lin, Xiang, Liang, Zhao, Yin & Jin, 2017), 
whereas the enhanced P3 amplitude for distinct probes suggests that, at later stages of processing, 
the feeling of certainty induced by the accumulation of sensory evidence increases participants’ 
allocation of attentional resources (e.g. Kelly & O’Connell, 2013), making the P3 component a 
likely correlate of metacognition (e.g. Desender et al., 2016). The conscious effect of the social 
feedback was found for the LPP response at around 400 ms, when disputed ambiguous probes 
triggered a larger sustained positivity, in line with the emotional appraisal of the face expressions 
(e.g. Ito & al., 1998). 
In the last study, we were interested in replicating the effects of ambiguity and social conflict on 
early perceptual processes in healthy and socially anxious individuals (e.g. Peschard et al., 2013). 
For this, we used the same experimental paradigm but we added a stressor (speech induction) in 
order to explore the effects of anticipation in a socially anxious population compared to non-
socially anxious participants. Again, behavioural results indicated that confidence ratings were 
lower for ambiguous probes and even lower when the social cue was in disagreement. This was 
observed for both groups, although the pattern was enhanced in socially anxious individuals, as 
expected. Interestingly, confidence ratings for ambiguous probes following agreement were 
increased in the social anxious group compared to healthy subjects, suggesting higher sensitivity 
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to agreement in uncertain situation across the former. Electrophysiologically, findings were 
replicated for the early visual P1 component in both groups. Indeed, the P1 was enhanced for 
ambiguous probes compared to distinct ones, before and after the social feedback and for both 
groups. However, socially anxious individuals showed a decreased P1 for all conditions 
suggesting that anticipation of the social context decreased sensory facilitation of stimuli in the 
social environment. The effect of the social feedback was also replicated with the anterior N1, as 
this component was enhanced for ambiguous disputed probes in both groups. The N1 pattern was 
again diminished for all conditions in socially anxious individuals, thus supporting Clarks & 
Wells (1995) cognitive model for social anxiety, which posits a reduction in attention to external 
stimuli due to excessive self-focusing. Finally, we looked at the face-sensitivity N170 
component, as most studies investigating socially anxious attentional biases focalised on the 
response locked to faces. In line, with these studies, we did not find any social anxious 
modulation for this ERP, corroborating that the early structural analysis of faces is not altered in 
this disorder (e.g. Harrewijn et al., 2017). 
Although the three studies demonstrate that social feedback had an influence on early perception, 
the question remains whether this social feedback made up of emotional facial expressions 
indicating agreement (expressions of happiness) or disagreement (expressions of disgust), can 
truly be called social influence. It could be that the emotional valence of the faces modulated 
perceptual processes instead of the social group pressure itself. However, several important 
aspects reduce the probability of this interpretation. First, participants were told that the feedback 
was made up of responses of the majority of a sample population of women and men tested 
beforehand. Second, both probes in each trial, before and after feedback, were identical. Third, 
participants were asked at the end of the procedure if they believed in the social feedback. Fourth, 
effects of emotion arise later on, at around 400ms and fifth, behavioural results showed that 
participants altered their response and confidence levels following disputed feedback. Thus, we 
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can conclude that the social cue was experienced by participants as a social pressure from a social 
majority. Nevertheless, it would be interesting in a future study to add a condition where social 
feedback is given by a robot in agreement or disagreement. 
Taken together, the behavioural results in the three studies showed that participants were 
challenged in their judgements when facing uncertainty induced by stimulus ambiguity and were 
further influenced when the social feedback was in disagreement. The decreased average 
confidence ratings for ambiguous stimuli and disputed social feedback indicated that uncertainty 
and social conflict had a strong effect on their subjective feeling of certainty, and this effect was 
enhanced in socially anxious individuals compared to healthy subjects. From an 
electrophysiological point of view, the findings demonstrate that endogenous attention can have 
a top-down effect on early automatic exogenous attention and on early visual perception when 
stimuli are relevant to the task and when social pressure provokes uncertainty. Moreover, human 
beings seem to be sensitive to the amount of stimulus sensory evidence increasing the feeling of 
accuracy allowing metacognitive experiences to take place. These effects of uncertainty and 
social influence are enhanced in socially anxious individuals, demonstrating their vulnerability 
to potentially threatening information in the environment. 
Findings contribute to the understanding of human attitudes and neural correlates in conflict 
social situations by demonstrating how early unconscious perception and controlled conscious 
processes unfold in our daily life as we are constantly facing uncertainty and social pressure. 
Moreover, results across socially anxious subjects have clinical implications in terms of 
therapeutic work, demonstrating the importance of anticipation of the social context in this 
populations. 
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6. ANNEXES 
6.1. Liebowitz questionnaire (French version) 
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6.2. Debriefing (study 3) 
Debriefing 
 
 
Code participant………. 
 
L’expérience que vous avez réalisée fait partie du domaine des neurosciences sociales. Par 
conséquent, et afin de vous influencer socialement, nous vous avons transmis un message sur 
la signification des feedbacks de la source sociale (expression de joie et de dégout des visages) 
qui ne représentait pas la réalité.  Les expressions de joie et dégout des visages étaient 
aléatoires et indépendants de votre réponse au 1er carré de couleur. De plus, nous avons voulu 
induire de l’anxiété avec la phrase qui se trouvait dans les informations aux participants : « A 
la fin de l’expérience, 3 psychologues vous demanderont de vous présenter et décrire votre 
ressenti durant l’expérience ». Ce message est un leurre et est donc également faux.  
 
 
Sur la base de ces nouvelles informations, nous avons besoin de votre confirmation que vous 
êtes d’accord qu’on utilise vos données à des fin de recherche. 
 
 
 
   Oui, j’autorise l’utilisation de mes données à des fins de recherche 
 
 
   Non, je n’autorise pas l’utilisation de mes données à des fins de recherche 
 
 
